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BOOK REVIEW
Learned Hand: The Jurisprudential
Trajectory of an Old Progressive
EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR.t
For more than half a century Learned Hand sat on the federal
bench, and he is still widely considered the greatest American
judge never to sit on the United States Supreme Court.1 For two
decades Gerald Gunther, a distinguished authority on constitu-
tional law, has labored faithfully on his biography. Such an excep-
tional combination of author and subject promises a weighty and
stimulating result, and Learned Hand: The Man and the Judge2
amply fulfills the expectation. It is massive in scope, elegant in
style, insightful in analysis, and sensitive in characterization.
Gunther examines the noteworthy events that marked Hand's
public career and explores the fears, beliefs, aspirations, and inse-
curities that shaped his private reality. Extensive and astonish-
ingly rich sources underwrite the inner exploration, and Gunther
carefully seasons his reading of the historical materials with his
own first-hand knowledge of his subject, gleaned from his service
as Hand's law clerk in 1953-54 and the years of friendship that
followed.3 The resulting biography reveals a largely unknown inner
person while casting new light on a well-known outer one.
The very strengths that help make the book so successful,
however, carry some limitations. As the wealth of personal material
deepens and enriches the book, it also narrows it. Beyond sketch-
ing broad historical periods, the book tends to assume social, polit-
ical, and intellectual change as a distant backdrop for Hand's per-
sonal journey. Similarly, the volumes of opinions that Hand wrote
during his tenure of more than half a century on the bench receive
t Professor of Law, New York Law School. I wish to thank William P. LaPiana, Rachel
Vorspan, and Harry H. Wellington for their comments on an earlier draft.
1. See, e.g., GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE iX-X (1994).
2. Id.
3. Gunther appears directly in the book only once, when he recounts Hand's work on
an important Cold War case in 1954. See id. at 620-21.
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highly selective and surprisingly truncated consideration. Such
limitations, however, detract little from the book's contributions.
Gunther decided to mine his richest sources and exhaust the
purest veins, keeping his focus on the true subject he
chose-Learned Hand, the complex and intriguing human being.
The panorama of issues the book presents compels selectivity.
This review, consequently, focuses on one major theme that Gun-
ther explores-the evolution of Hand's politics and his ideas about
judicial review. Two reasons support this focus. First, although
Hand was not primarily, or even significantly, a constitutional
judge, he is closely associated with a major tradition in American
constitutional law and ultimately authored its most extreme and
well-known statement.' As a figure in American constitutional and
intellectual history, his position on judicial self-restraint consti-
tutes his primary claim to our attention. Second, most previous ac-
counts of Hand's constitutional philosophy have concentrated on
his debt to his teacher, James Bradley Thayer, and his resulting
life-long commitment to judicial restraint. They have consequently
downplayed or ignored the extent to which his ideas changed over
time. To some extent Gunther's book continues that tradition. Al-
though it provides a mass of revealing information and a wealth of
perceptive insights, it does not focus as sharply as it might on the
historian's basic questions: When, why, and how did Hand change?
Accordingly, after discussing Gunther's overall treatment of
Hand in Part I, this review examines in detail three major phases
in Hand's political and intellectual development. It seeks to iden-
tify the areas where Gunther illuminates that evolution as well as
the areas where his account seems incomplete. Part II considers
the ways in which Hand adapted Thayer's ideas in developing his
own version of progressive jurisprudence. Part III examines the
evolution of Hand's First Amendment jurisprudence and explores
the path that led him from his libertarian opinion in Masses Pub-
lishing Co. v. Patten5 to his later conclusion that courts should de-
fer to legislative judgments even when First Amendment claims
were at stake. Part IV considers Hand's most elaborate and famous
statement about the scope of judicial review, his three lectures
published in 1958 as The Bill of Rights.'
4. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (Atheneum 1964)(1958).
5. 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
6. HAND, supra note 4.
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I. GUNTHER'S LIFE OF LEARNED HAND
The nutshell biography, of course, is familiar. Born in 1872,
Learned Hand grew up in Albany, New York, the offspring of lo-
cally prominent families and a long line of lawyers and judges.
Graduating from Harvard College in 1893, he studied at Harvard
Law School and then returned to Albany where he practiced for
several years. In 1902 he married and moved to New York City.
Building a modestly successful law practice, he developed a wide
range of friends and acquaintances, became increasingly active in
progressive politics, and in 1909 was appointed United States Dis-
trict Judge for the Southern District of New York. Although he
remained politically active for another decade, Hand gradually
withdrew from politics shortly after World War I. His reputation
as a judge began to grow, and in 1924 he was promoted to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. There, dur-
ing the next thirty-seven years, he reigned as the most widely
respected judge in the lower federal courts and, in some people's
minds, in the entire federal judiciary. Twice he was almost ap-
pointed to the Supreme Court, but both times the nomination es-
caped him. Surprisingly for a lower court judge, he developed a
national reputation, the result of his exceptional judicial stature
and the powerful resonance of his public speeches and writings. A
passionate advocate of "judicial restraint," a firm believer in demo-
cratic government, and an intellectual skeptic with a fervent com-
mitment to freedom of speech and thought, the elderly judge en-
ded his long and illustrious career widely known, admired, and
respected.
Gunther is fascinated by Hand's personality, particularly by
what he sees as his sense of being a social outsider and his "ex-
traordinary self-doubts and anxieties." 8 Hand, he tells us, had an
"almost masochistic penchant for self-doubt and self-criticism."9
Gunther sensitively traces this quality to the demanding traditions
and expectations of his family, his position as "the precious male"
surrounded and "spoiled" by the family's several women, and a re-
ligious upbringing that "transmuted" the fear of God and Hell into
"an anxious sense of duty."10 Most significantly, he also traces it to
his father's local prominence and then sudden death when Learned
was only fourteen and to "the image of paternal perfection" that
7. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 639-52.
8. Id. at 4. For his general sense of being an "outsider," see, e.g., id. at 4-13, 26-31, 152,
154.
9. Id. at 513.
10. Id. at 11, 17.
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his "hovering, sometimes smothering" mother persistently
"drilled" into the young boy.11 For most of his life, Gunther ex-
plains, Hand was "blinded by his deeply ingrained family percep-
tion of [his father] as an intellectual giant of unmatchable
talents. '12
Even more sensitive is Gunther's treatment of Hand's some-
what unusual marriage. Inexperienced in matters of the heart,
Learned had been utterly taken with Frances Fincke, a young Bryn
Mawr graduate. He courted her assiduously and after they married
proved entirely devoted to her. For her part, Frances had main-
tained a particularly close friendship with her college roommate
and then, after marriage, developed an unusually close relationship
with Louis Dow, a male college professor who lived near the
Hand's summer home in New Hampshire. Frequently, Frances was
away from Learned and with Dow in New Hampshire, especially
after 1913 when Dow's wife was committed to an institution. On
several occasions, she even accompanied Dow to Europe while
Learned remained at home. Although Gunther finds no evidence
that Frances and Dow "ever had a physical affair," he concludes
that she failed regularly and for long periods of time to give
Learned the affection, attention, and companionship that he so
deeply and obviously craved.' Hand finally confronted her shortly
after the war, but to no avail. She continued her long absences in
New Hampshire and remained in Dow's company regularly, while
Learned "accepted her decision and acquiesced in her desires. 1 4
Gunther discusses the marriage at length, both because he had
available an extraordinary documentary record and because it was
clearly of great importance to his subject. A review, especially one
focused on Hand's politics and his ideas about judicial review,
might delicately ignore the subject. Unfortunately, however, one
rather too obvious question jumps to the fore. Is it possible that
the psychological makeup that would help explain his willingness
to defer to his wife's deeply hurtful behavior would also help ex-
plain his extreme version of judicial self-restraint? One hardly
need strain, after all, to note a parallel between his personal and
judicial self-abnegation- between his willingness to accept both
the extreme marital independence of his wife and the extreme con-
stitutional independence of other governmental branches.1
11. Id. at 6, 10.
12. Id. at 9.
13. Id. at 187.
14. Id.
15. Gunther suggests, though he does not methodically explore, the likelihood that
Hand's judicial self-restraint was rooted in emotional and psychological sources. Cf. Carl
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While Gunther stays away from such speculations, perhaps
wisely, he does suggest another facet of Hand's personal life that
surely did influence his career and politics. Whatever his psycho-
logical anxieties and early professional struggles, Hand was amaz-
ingly fortunate in the ethnic, social, and economic position he oc-
cupied. He worried about his career at the bar, but he had friends
and relatives with extensive professional contacts who helped him
along. He worried about being a social outsider, but he managed to
become friends with a wide range of prominent people. By 1898,
for example, when he was only twenty-six, he "had gotten to know
[Theodore Roosevelt] somewhat."1 He worried about money, but
his family provided him with moderate inheritances, and his con-
nections brought him jobs where he earned a more than respecta-
ble living. By 1906, after only four years in New York City, he was
able to pay almost $30,000 for a Manhattan brownstone and an-
other $20,000 for a summer home. 17 He worried about being a fail-
ure as a practicing attorney and wished at the age of only thirty-
five to become a federal judge, and his friends secured the position
for him within a mere two years.' 8 While Gunther records these
various episodes,19 he may underestimate the insight they offer
into Hand's personality. Beyond his personal anxieties and insecu-
rities; it would seem, Hand was also comforted quite luxuriously by
the experience of profound support and lived security. In many
ways his life led him to share in the complacency of an upper mid-
dle-class social and economic elite.20
As much as his social position provided opportunities, how-
ever, it was Hand's impressive personal qualities that repeatedly
Landauer, Scholar, Craftsman, and Priest: Learned Hand's Self-Imagining, 3 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 231 (1991).
16. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 64.
17. Id. at 99, 139. "Among young professionals in the Hands' circle, a summer place was
the norm." Id. at 99.
18. Id. at 123-33. It should be noted, as Gunther points out, that the position of federal
district judge lacked much of the prestige that the position now commands. E.g., id. at 139.
19. E.g., id. at 230, 418, 438.
20. Hand was intimately involved in the social life of New York City's eminent, well-to-
do, and overwhelmingly Anglo-Saxon Protestant elite. Id. at 408-09, 455. He led a distinctly
upper-middle class life and travelled abroad frequently in the summer, id. at 369-73, and he
was essentially insulated from the depression. In 1930, for example, Hand decided that he
should provide for his three daughters by leaving each of them a minimum of $100,000. Id.
at 430. Although he showed an early and "energetic hostility to the prevailing anti-semitism
of his class," id. at 115, he could show the marks of that class. See id. at 409 (Hand makes
an "unusual" anti-semitic "slur"). His wife also manifested anti-semitic attitudes. Id. at
285-86, 409. Class attitudes seemed to underwrite Hand's ambivalent feelings about Frank-
lin Roosevelt, id. at 455-56, as they did his view, expressed in the 1920s, that "the ghost of
the innocent man convicted" was nothing more than "an unreal dream." Id. at 391.
1995]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
attracted friends and inspired them to assist him. As Gunther
phrases it, they "recognized his acuity and breadth and admired
the independence of his mind. '21 In fact, the cumulating details of
this intimate biography gradually convince the reader of one basic,
if somewhat elusive, conclusion. Hand was, indeed, an individual of
exceptional intelligence, extraordinary analytical powers, and an
unusually free and self-reliant judgment. Those qualities, com-
bined with his basic decency, his capacity for kindness, and his
keen love of wit, make it readily understandable why so many peo-
ple wished to see him advance.
Gunther draws on these personal and social considerations
when he details the slow accretion of factors that led Hand, in the
years after 1900, to "a passionate commitment" to reform. 22 Many
of the compelling forces, of course, were characteristic of the pe-
riod. The Spanish-American War stirred his interest in politics,
and a sharpening awareness of the social hardships of industrial-
ism began to distress him.23 Professional experience, too, played a
role as Hand's practice led him to public hearings, a local labor
strike, and an investigation of a state mental hospital. 4 But, as
Gunther nicely shows, more personal factors also moved Hand to-
ward progressivism. His life-long unease about being a "social out-
sider" gave him a special sensitivity to the disadvantaged, 25 and his
probing intellect, philosophical bent, and pervasive skepticism led
him to doubt prevailing social and economic verities. His law
school training accentuated his belief in the breadth and flexibility
of legislative power,26 while a deep commitment to reasoned action
fired his enthusiasm for the possibilities of intelligent social
reform.27
Perhaps of greatest importance for Hand's political growth
was the network of friends he established after his move to New
York City. During the next dozen years Hand developed close rela-
tionships with many prominent reformers, including C.C. Burling-
ham, George Rublee, Felix Frankfurter, Norman Hapgood, Walter
Lippmann, and Herbert Croly. "Hand's interest in American polit-
ics," Gunther believes, "was closely related to his friendships."28
Hand met Croly, for example, in 1908 when the two were summer
21. Id. at 107.
22. Id. at 190.
23. Id. at 61-64, 67, 113.
24. Id. at 65-67.
25. Id. at 115; see id. at 362, 367, 431.
26. Id. at 373-74.
27. See, e.g., id. at 33-36, 40-43, 231, 240, 581-82.
28. Id. at 190.
[Vol. 43
LEARNED HAND
neighbors. They "established an immediate and warm rapport,"2e
and Croly's political thinking "struck an especially responsive
chord in Hand."30 When Croly published The Promise of Ameri-
can Life the following year, Hand's enthusiasm was so great that
he sent a copy to Theodore Roosevelt who subsequently hailed it
as a major influence on his own "New Nationalism." 1 Hand was
drawn into progressive politics and soon began working with
Roosevelt closely on political issues involving the judiciary, espe-
cially the question of the recall of judges and decisions. In 1913 he
helped Croly found The New Republic as the intellectual organ of
national progressivism, and the next year he stood as the Progres-
sive Party candidate for chief judge of the New York Court of Ap-
peals. Although he lost the election, he continued to advise the
Progressive Party and contribute short pieces to The New Repub-
lic. "For once in his life," Gunther writes of Hand's pre-war pro-
gressivism, "he was a true believer. ' s2
After the war, Hand gradually withdrew from politics, and his
progressivism began to atrophy. In part, he was responding to a
growing sense that political activism was inappropriate for a fed-
eral judge. Gunther believes that the "central truth was that an
older, wiser, and more reflective Learned Hand had decided that"
judicial separation from politics "was essential to the fairness of
courts."33 Whatever the nature of Hand's altered views about polit-
ical activism on the bench, it seems likely - contrary to Gunther's
conclusion-that more significant factors also conspired to draw
him away from progressivism. Not only did the political mood of
the country change drastically in the twenties, dampening reform
ardor and turning attention elsewhere, but Hand also found him-
self increasingly in disagreement with the substance of post-war
progressivism. He split bitterly with Croly and the editors of The
New Republic over their decision to oppose the Treaty of Ver-
sailles, 34 and then during the twenties he found himself unsympa-
thetic with several progressive causes and sometimes at odds with
such old colleagues as Lippmann and Frankfurter. 5 Here, in fact,
Gunther renders one of his harshest judgments. Confronted during
the 1920s by several important issues implicating free speech,
Hand "vacillated," Gunther concludes, and "showed the uncer-
29. Id.
30. Id. at 193.
31. Id. at 192-93.
32. Id. at 190.
33. Id. at 345. For Hand's earlier view of the propriety of his activism see id. at 237-39.
34. Id. at 264-66.
35. Id. at 382-98.
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tainty, even fearfulness, that had been part of his makeup ever
since childhood." 6 In particular, Gunther faults him for failing tojoin Frankfurter in protesting the Sacco and Vanzetti case, and
here he suggests that Hand's contemporaneous comments urging
judicial self-restraint had important psychological roots. At least
"some of his greater caution," Gunther charges flatly, "was less the
product of self-disciplined 'forbearance' than of what he himself
sometimes called a lack of courage."3
Gunther also suggests, without exploring the idea sufficiently,
that the growing recognition Hand received for his work as a judge
accelerated his declining interest in both active politics and pro-
gressive causes. In 1922 Hand was one of only a few federal judges
invited to join the elite of the American bar in founding the pres-
tigious American Law Institute. Even more impressive, he was one
of only twenty-one individuals asked to serve on the Institute's
governing council. His emergence among the bar's creme de la
creme both confirmed and enhanced his growing professional re-
nown, 38 and two years later he at last received his promotion to the
Second Circuit. At the same time, his reputation began to spread
beyond the profession, and the non-partisan speeches and essays
he prepared on law and culture began attracting favorable notice
in the general press.3 9 Hand must have realized that the "most im-
portant ingredient of [his] mounting renown was clearly his work
on the bench. '40 If so, Gunther's suggestion seems to run, Hand
came to realize that his judicial career held the promise of unusual
success and that the achievement of such success depended funda-
mentally on his work and persona as a judge. "If it be selfishness to
work on the job one likes, because one likes it and for no other
end," Hand declared in 1927, "let us accept the odium."' 4' That
recognition counselled withdrawal from politics, great care in judi-
cial craftsmanship, and a far more austere public image.42
In spite of his withdrawal from politics, Hand remained keenly
36. Id. at 388.
37. Id. at 388.
38. Id. at 411-12.
39. Id. at 347.
40. Id. at 345.
41. Learned Hand, The Preservation of Personality, BRYN MAWR ALUMNAE BULL., Oct.
1927, at 7-14 [hereinafter Preservation of Personality], reprinted in THE SPIRIT OF LMERTY:
PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 23, 34 (Irving Dilliard ed., Vintage Books 1959)
(1952) [hereinafter SPIRIT OF LEBERTY]. This hypothesis would be consistent with Hand's
unusual emphasis on "jobbism." See id.; GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 401-05.
42. See OTIs L. GRAHAM, JR., AN ENCORE FOR REFORM: THE OLD PROGRESSIVES AND THE
NEW DEAL 151 (1967) (describing the withdrawal of most progressives from events "outside
a narrowly personal orbit"). See generally Landauer, supra note 15.
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interested in both domestic and foreign affairs. His views remained
vaguely progressive, but they also became increasingly ambivalent
and constrained as he grew more skeptical about the capacities of
experts, governments, and the people. He continued to accept the
need for government economic regulation, but his public concerns
began to shift from issues of social and economic inequality to
more personal problems of maintaining individual liberty in the
context of an expanding and oppressive mass consumer culture.43
His attitude toward the New Deal was mixed. He recognized the
need for forceful government action and approved or at least sym-
pathized with many New Deal efforts, but he also disliked the mas-
sive spending, swelling bureaucracies, and expansion of executive
powers they brought in their wake."
Gunther tracks Hand's later years with equal care, and the re-
sults provide a rich personal view of many of the major political
and legal issues that marked the 1940s and 1950s. A dedicated in-
ternationalist, Hand was caught up in the foreign crises of the
1930s and then the World War and Cold War that followed. He
was deeply distressed over the rise of McCarthyism, and in private
he criticized the Republican party for behaving "with indecency"
in its attacks on the Truman administration and its Secretary of
State, Dean Acheson.45
In discussing McCarthyism Gunther offers one of his relatively
few harsh judgments on Hand's behavior. Noting that "Hand, like
most Americans, still failed to speak out publicly against Mc-
Carthyism, 4 e he suggests that the "principal factor involved here
was, surely, Hand's own fearful nature. 47 The judgment seems un-
necessary and unfair. First, as Gunther notes, few people were will-
ing to speak out against McCarthy in the early 1950s. If Hand was
at fault, his failing hardly evidenced any unusual fearfulness. Sec-
ond, as an active federal judge, he had a special reason to maintain
public silence. Sitting on the Second Circuit, he was in the middle
of several significant communist-related prosecutions that coun-
selled special prudence.48 Third, and most importantly, Hand did
in fact speak out. He did so in a highly visible forum-the annual
dinner of the American Law Institute-and at a relatively early
43. Preservation of Personality, supra note 41, at 23-35.
44. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 440-42, 444-45, 453-57.
45. Id. at 577-86.
46. Id. at 585.
47. Id. at 586.
48. Gunther discounts this justification for Hand's silence by pointing to three other




date, May, 1951. 41 If Hand were culpable on this particular score,
his failing seems minimal.
Beyond exploring Hand's life and politics, of course, Gunther
examines his extraordinarily long and illustrious judicial career, es-
pecially his period of greatest fame from the mid 1920s through
the 1950s. Gunther tells us that Hand quickly established himself
as the Second Circuit's intellectual leader, a position he held long
before he became the circuit's Chief Judge in 1939.50 He shows how
Hand sought consistently to uphold legislative enactments and to
effectuate their purposes, and he identifies several areas in which
he showed a deep sympathy for the poor and unfortunate who
faced government prosecutions.51 Moreover, Gunther shows that
Hand retained throughout his career a fervent belief in the values
of free speech and free thought. His unquestioned leadership and
growing national stature, together with the exceptionally high cali-
bre of the entire bench, brought the Second Circuit's reputation to
its professional zenith. For a quarter of a century, Gunther de-
clares, it "symbolized the highest judicial quality for the nation. '5 2
Addressing Hand's career on the Second Circuit, Gunther con-
fronts an unavoidable question. Was Hand truly a "great" judge
and, if so, why? Gunther's answer to the first question is resound-
ingly affirmative, but his answer to the second is more diffuse and
less convincing. Although he discusses Hand's judicial work in nu-
merous sections, he evaluates it most systematically in one long
chapter focusing on the 1920s and 1930s. 83 Here, Gunther describes
Hand's working habits, his tactful and congenial relations with his
colleagues, his joyfulness in dealing with legal issues, his assiduous
efforts to master factual details, his determination to probe the le-
gal sources for their wisest and truest teaching, and his deep per-
sonal commitment to fairness and honesty in reaching the proper
disposition. Seeking to demonstrate the depth and care of his anal-
yses, Gunther focuses in particular on Hand's opinions in the areas
of admiralty, copyright, patents, and obscenity. Although he fre-
quently tells his readers that Hand was great, he does not consist-
ently succeed in showing him so. Some of Gunther's discussions are
49. Id. at 587-88; see Learned Hand, Telling the Bar, WASH. POST, May 27, 1951, at
All, reprinted in SPIRIT OF LmERTY, supra note 41, at 169. Hand issued an even stronger
attack on McCarthyism the next year. See Learned Hand, The Future of Wisdom in
America, SATURDAY REV., Nov. 22, 1952, at 9, reprinted in SPIRIT OF LIBERTY, supra note 41,
at 208; GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 588-89.
50. GUNTHER, supra' note 1, at 297.
51. Hand, for example, showed special solicitude for aliens, id. at 303-04, 629-38, and
for those deprived of the protections of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 305, 596-98.
52. Id. at 284.
53. Id. at 278-343.
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illuminating and persuasive 4 but others seem insufficiently devel-
oped either to allow readers to recognize whatever unusual quali-
ties Hand exhibited or to persuade them that his conclusions were
necessarily so impressive. Surprisingly, too, several of Hand's most
famous and presumably most important decisions are simply
missing.2
In fairness, the task of showing why Hand was a "great" judge
constitutes a daunting challenge, especially in a biography so rich
in other interests and so clearly designed for a general audience.
Hand was a judge in a lower federal court, and his efforts were
most commonly directed toward relatively narrow and technical
problems in federal specialties and statutory construction. With
few exceptions, his institutional position prevented him from serv-
ing as either an architect of the Constitution or a shaper of basic
common law principles. Thus, Gunther's opportunities were se-
verely restricted in those areas where judicial biographies usually
focus and where the "major" contributions of American judges ap-
pear most obvious and easily explainable.
If Gunther enjoys only limited success in showing Hand's judi-
cial greatness through an examination of his opinions, however, he
succeeds on a different and perhaps ultimately more meaningful
level, at least for his general readers. He makes it easy to believe
that Hand must have been a great judge. Illustrating repeatedly
and in a variety of circumstances Hand's honesty, integrity, perspi-
cacity, and intelligence, Gunther shows that he possessed to an ex-
traordinary degree that single most essential of qualities, the qual-
ity of good judgment.
54. For example, Gunther shows Hand's exacting attention to detail in a series of admi-
ralty suits and his intellectual rigor in dealing with patent and copyright law. Id. at 308-28.
Similarly, in a later chapter he nicely illustrates, in contrast to Frankfurter's approach,
Hand's crisp and focused treatment of an issue arising under the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938. Id. at 467-71.
55. See Richard A. Posner, The Learned Hand Biography and the Question of Judicial
Greatness, 104 YALE L.J. 511 passim (1994); John F. Wirenius, Helping Hand: The Life and
the Legacy of Learned Hand, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 505, 515-25 (1994). For discussions of
Hand's work as a judge see MARVIN SCHICK, LEARNED HAND'S COURT 154-91 (1970); see also
Symposium, Judge Learned Hand, 60 HARv. L. REV. 325 (1947).
56. This conclusion, unfortunately, comes only from considering the bulk of Gunther's
book. However, at least one example seems appropriate: immediately after being passed
over for the Supreme Court, a crushing disappointment, Hand was nevertheless able to ana-
lyze his situation, and Frankfurter's role in it, with fairness and acuity. GUNTHER, supra
note 1, at 567-68.
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II. HAND, THAYER, AND LEGAL PROGRESSIVISM
James Bradley Thayer, Gunther tells us, was "the one teacher
Hand admired in every respect. 5 7 Thayer taught Hand evidence
during his second year at Harvard Law School, and his "tentative
and moderate" approach "was the un-Langdellian one of eschew-
ing the search for orderly systems and emphasizing instead the his-
torical and human dimensions too often ignored by his col-
leagues. '5 8 Hand recalled Thayer's courses as "the fitting crown of
the whole three years" in law school."
Thayer was best known, of course, for his views about judicial
review. His "greatest impact on Learned," Gunther continues,
"came in a third-year course in constitutional law."80 Thayer
taught his students a deep suspicion of judges who allowed their
own "predetermined attitudes" to override the actions of the legis-
lative and executive branches."" He was "the prophet of a new ap-
proach" to the Constitution,"2 Hand declared, and his impact "was
to imbue us with a scepticism about the wisdom of setting up
courts as the final arbiters of social conflicts.
6 3
Notwithstanding Thayer's influence, however, Hand did not
simply adopt Thayer's ideas in toto nor adhere to them without
modification. Gunther's emphasis on Hand's life-long allegiance to
Thayer leads him to overlook the ways in which Hand, as a pre-
war progressive, modified his teacher's ideas and used them for his
own political purposes.
A. Thayer's "American Doctrine"
While Thayer influenced countless students through his course
and through his massive casebook on constitutional law,6 4 his wid-
est and most enduring influence came from an essay he published
in 1893, the year Hand entered law school. "The Origin and Scope
57. Id. at 50.
58. Id. at 51. His comments on Thayer remind us that there were, after all, relatively
few stereotypical "conceptualists" around in the late nineteenth century, even in the law
schools. See generally WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGINS OF MOD-
ERN AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION (1994).
59. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 50; see also id. at 52.
60. Id. at 51.
61. Id.
62. Learned Hand, Chief Justice Stone's Concept of the Judicial Function, 57 COLUM.
L. REV. 696 (1946) [hereinafter Chief Justice Stone], reprinted in SPIRIT OF LIBERTY, supra
note 41, at 152, 154.
63. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 51.
64. See generally JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Cambridge,
Mass., University Press 1895).
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of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law"65 contains an ac-
count of the development of judicial review in the United States
and a careful prescription for its proper scope. The essay's princi-
pal argument is that the role of the courts should be sharply lim-
ited and that judicial invalidation of an executive or legislative act
is allowable only when its unconstitutionality is "so clear that it is
not open to rational question."66 This so-called "rule of the clear
mistake" meant, according to Thayer, that legislative and execu-
tive acts should be sustained if they could be justified under any
"rational" interpretation of the Constitution, no matter how
fiercely such interpretation might be disputed. "[W]hatever choice
is rational is constitutional." 7 The capacious phrases of the Con-
stitution, Thayer stressed, necessarily allowed a wide range of "ra-
tional" interpretations.6
Much evidence testifies to the influence of Thayer's "Ameri-
can Doctrine." As Gunther notes, Hand frequently expressed his
indebtedness and considered his own views on judicial review the
direct result of Thayer's teachings.6 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
Theodore Roosevelt, Louis D. Brandeis, and Felix Frankfurter
were among the many national figures who also claimed allegiance
to his views.7 0 Nearing the end of his own long career on the Su-
preme Court, Frankfurter proclaimed Thayer's "American Doc-
trine" the "most important single essay" ever written on American
constitutional law and termed it "the great guide for judges. 7
Thayer's essay resonated with particular force, of course, be-
cause it appeared near the dawn of a newly activist and "conserva-
tive" federal judiciary and only a few years prior to the emergence
of political progressivism. 2 Hand, Brandeis, Roosevelt, and Frank-
furter all sprang to the support of the new reform movement, and
they frequently criticized the Supreme Court for its decisions in-
validating governmental efforts to regulate the economy and pro-
65. James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Consti-
tutional Law, 7 HARv. L. REV. 129 (1893) [hereinafter American Doctrine].
66. Id. at 144.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 51-52, 373.
70. Wallace Mendelson, The Influence of James B. Thayer Upon the Work of Holmes,
Brandeis, and Frankfurter, 31 VAND. L. REV. 71 (1978); Jay Hook, A Brief Life of James
Bradley Thayer, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 8 (1993).
71. FELIX FRANKFURTER, FELIX FRANKFURTER REMINISCES 300-01 (1960) (recorded in
talks with Dr. Harlan B. Phillips).
72. See ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT 237-53 (1992); EDWARD A.
PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL
AMERICA, 1870-1958, at 282-91 (1992); ARNOLD M. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE
OF LAW: ATTITUDES OF BAR AND BENCH, 1887-1895, at 221-37 (1960).
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tect industrial workers. All, for example, fiercely attacked Lochner
v. New York,73 the case that subsequently, if somewhat mislead-
ingly, gave its name to a half century of constitutional law. There,
the Court struck down a state statute limiting the work hours of
bakers on the ground that it violated the due process rights of both
employers and employees to freedom of contract. Hand responded
with a scathing piece in the Harvard Law Review that declared the
Court's doctrine a "usurpation" and echoed Thayer's argument
that courts could invalidate a statute only when its unconstitution-
ality was "obvious beyond peradventure. '7 4
Like most of those who have written about Thayer's influence,
Gunther does not discuss the extent to which the legal progressives
modified their mentor's ideas. The "American Doctrine" essay
does not quite make the argument they attributed to it. True, it
does argue that judicial review has a narrow scope and that courts
can invalidate governmental actions only when they constituted
"clear mistakes." True, also, the essay emphasizes the broad con-
stitutional role of Congress, stresses the weakness of courts as bul-
warks of free government, and concludes with a plea for Americans
to look to themselves and their democratic institutions for their
"chief protection." 5 The essay, however, also advances two other
propositions that give it a somewhat different slant than many of
its progressive acolytes acknowledged.
First, Thayer explained that the rule of the clear mistake ap-
plies only when the courts are "revising the work of a co-ordinate
department." 6 When "the national judiciary"77 reviews actions
taken by the states, however, they "have a different matter in
hand.117  State actions, unlike federal actions, present potential
challenges "to the paramount constitution, the supreme law of the
land. 79 The federal courts, Thayer insisted, had a "duty in all
questions involving the powers of the general government to main-
tain that power as against the States in its fulness." 80
Second, in order to check the states tightly, Thayer prescribed
73. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
74. Learned Hand, Due Process of Law and the Eight-Hour Day, 21 HARv. L. REv. 495,
496, 500 (1908) [hereinafter Eight-Hour Day]. Thayer, for example, maintained that the
court's role in reviewing legislation was analogous to its role in reviewing jury verdicts on
their facts. American Doctrine, supra note 38, at 147-48. Hand used the same analogy.
Eight-Hour Day, supra, at 500; see also GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 118-23.
75. American Doctrine, supra note 65, at 156; see also id. at 136 n.1.
76. Id. at 150.
77. Id. at 155.





a more rigorous standard for federal review of their actions.81 The
national courts had the "duty" of maintaining the nation's "para-
mount authority in its true and just proportions."82 That "nar-
row" and "literal" standard-the "true and just" interpretation of
the Constitution-was radically different from the standard appli-
cable under the rule of the clear mistake. Under the latter stan-
dard, a court could not invalidate the act of a coordinate branch
"merely because it is concluded that upon a just and true con-
struction the law is unconstitutional." 8 To provide greater flexibil-
ity for national actions by negating appeals to the "true and just"
construction of the Constitution, Thayer explained, "is precisely
the significance of the rule [of the clear mistake]. 8 4 Unlike the
"clear mistake" standard, the "true and just" standard con-
ferred-and on Thayer's account encouraged-a broad judicial re-
view that promised to restrict state actions significantly. The "true
and just" standard "easily results in the wrong kind of disregard of
legislative considerations" and "really operates to extend the judi-
cial function beyond its just bounds. 8 5 While Thayer rejected that
"narrow" approach when the national courts reviewed federal ac-
tions, the "true and just" standard was precisely the approach he
sanctioned when they reviewed state actions.8 6
Both the structure of Thayer's "American Doctrine" essay and
the context within which he wrote, establish that his paramount
concern was to restrict judicial review of congressional legislation,
and that he viewed a more rigorous federal scrutiny of state ac-
81. Id.
82. Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 155.
83. Id. at 144 (emphasis added).
84. Id. The proper doctrine of judicial review, Thayer explained, is sometimes "per-
verted" by "a pedantic and academic treatment of the texts of the constitution and laws."
Id. at 138. Commentators who adopted this "literal" approach assumed that judicial review
was the same as "ordinary" legal work, "the mere and simple office of construing two writ-
ings and comparing one with another." Id. This "simple" and "narrow" approach "went
forward as smoothly as if the constitution were a private letter of attorney, and the court's
duty under it were precisely like any of its most ordinary operations." Id. at 139. Thayer
rejected that "literal" approach with scorn. It was "petty" and "narrow," and it lacked "that
combination of a lawyer's rigor with a statesman's breadth of view which should be found in
dealing with this class of questions of constitutional law." Id. at 138. The rule of the clear
mistake "corrected" the practice of judicial review by bringing "into play large considera-
tions not adverted to" in the "pedantic and academic" approach. Id. at 140.
85. Id. at 138.
86. Compare id. at 144 (federal court review of federal actions) with id. at 154-55 (fed-
eral court review of state actions).
Suggesting the importance he attributed to this more demanding standard of review,
Thayer applied it again when he addressed an analogous issue involving the relationship
between federal judicial power and state law. James Bradley Thayer, The Case of Gelpcke v.
Dubuque, 4 HARv. L. REv. 311 (1891).
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tions as both necessary and desirable.87 First, his essay focused al-
most exclusively on the former. Second, his avoidance of the latter
issue is highly suggestive since it was the most politically contro-
versial constitutional issue of the entire last quarter of the nine-
teenth century. Had Thayer believed in the need for special federal
judicial deference to state actions, he would surely have addressed
that issue specifically or expanded the rule of the clear mistake to
reach federal review of state actions. Third, Thayer had concrete
reasons to worry about the judicial review of federal actions be-
cause Congress was beginning to expand its regulatory efforts.
Shortly before he wrote, Congrees had passed the Interstate Com-
merce Act (1887) and the Sherman Antitrust Act (1890), and it
was considering a highly controversial new federal income tax law.
All were critical innovations that would have to pass constitutional
scrutiny. Finally, Thayer's argument for a double standard of re-
view had particular salience because many judges and commenta-
tors believed that the same single standard applied to both federal
and state actions. Proclaiming the Court's duty to review the ac-
tions of federal and state governments with equal strictness, such
writers-Justice Steven J. Field and Judge John F. Dillon, for ex-
ample-could not have failed to attract Thayer's attention."
87. Thayer urged a more rigorous standard of judicial review to protect federal power,
not to enforce individual rights against the states. His more rigorous standard for review of
state actions, however, made his doctrine more pliable than many of his progressive follow-
ers would allow and gave it the potential for justifying a broader kind of federal judicial
intervention against state actions. This, of course, is not meant to suggest that Thayer nec-
essarily approved as strict a standard of review over state actions as the Court seemed to be
developing in the nineties.
A passage from Thayer's book on Marshall, where he seems to cite cases involving fed-
eral review of state and of federal actions as parallel, might be thought to cast doubt on the
statement in the text. JAMs BRADLEY THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 106-07 (Da Capo Press
1974) (1901) [hereinafter MARSHALL]. The relevance of the passage, however, seems unclear.
While Thayer states that judicial invalidation of legislation is "now lamentably too com-
mon," id. at 107, he also declares that "the advantages in a popular government of this
conservative influence" of judicial review are "[g]reat and, indeed, inestimable." Id. at 106.
Perhaps of greatest significance, he neither criticizes any of the Supreme Court's pivotal
decisions from the 1890s that established a more restrictive approach to the review of state
actions nor abandons his familiar insistence that the rule of the clear mistake applies only
to the review of actions of coordinate branches. See generally id. at 102-09 (discussing the
position of the judiciary in the system of constitutional law).
88. See, e.g., Stephen J. Field, The Centenary of the Supreme Court of the United
States, Address at the Centennial Celebration of the Organization of the Federal Judiciary
(Feb. 4, 1890), in 24 AM. L. REv. 351, 360-63 (1890) [hereinafter Field Address]; John F.
Dillon, Law and Legislation, Conclusion of Address at Saratoga, N.Y. (Aug. 24, 1892) re-
printed in 26 AM. L. REv. 658, 665, 669-70, 674 (1892) [hereinafter Dillon Address].
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B. Creating Thayerian Progressivism
When Hand and other legal progressives drew on Thayer's
"American Doctrine" essay, they generally ignored both its distinc-
tion between the two standards of review and the stricter standard
it proposed for examining state actions. Further, they trained later
generations to see Thayer as the inspired voice of a generalized
philosophy of judicial restraint. 9 Such a picture is, of course,
rooted in a great deal of truth, 0 but it is also misleading.,"
The legal progressives drew a broader and somewhat different
lesson than Thayer had offered because their politics were pro-
foundly different from his. Thayer was a nineteenth-century Yan-
kee who imbibed the "Brahmin" culture of Boston and Harvard
and who served through the Civil War distributing news and prop-
aganda on behalf of the Loyal Publication Society. 2 His orienta-
tion was national, and his deepest political and emotional commit-
ments were to the preservation of the Union.93 Whatever disputes
89. General references to Thayer's theory of judicial review emphasize his advocacy of
"judicial restraint" and almost invariably ignore the difference between federal review of
federal actions and federal review of state actions. See, e.g., ROOSEvELT AND FRANKFURTER:
THEIR CORRESPONDENCE, 1928-1945, at 366 (Max Freedman ed., 1967).
A superb symposium on Thayer provides a more complex and sophisticated view of
Thayer and his thinking. See generally Symposium, One Hundred Years of Judicial Re-
view: The Thayer Centennial Symposium, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 1 (1993). Although many of
the articles point to the fact that Thayer did distinguish between federal review of federal
and state actions, they still tend to consider Thayer primarily as a spokesman for a genera-
lized position of judicial restraint. Several of the contributors, however, develop positions
that seem consistent with at least much of the argument in the text. See, e.g., Mark
Tushnet, Thayer's Target: Judicial Review or Democracy?, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 9 (1993); G.
Edward White, Revisiting James Bradley Thayer, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 48 (1993); Thomas C.
Grey, Thayer's Doctrine: Notes on Its Origins, Scope, and Present Implications, 88 Nw. U.
L. REv. 28 (1993).
90. See, e.g., American Doctrine, supra note 65, at 156; MARSHALL, supra note 87, at
102-07.
91. Thayer's other writings establish that his basic position on judicial review scarcely
changed from the mid-eighties to his death in 1902. Nine years before he wrote his "Ameri-
can Doctrine" essay he outlined the same basic views in The Nation and eight years after
the essay he reiterated those same views in a book on John Marshall. See James Bradley
Thayer, Constitutionality of Legislation: The Precise Question for a Court, NATION, Apr. 10,
1884 at 314; MARSHALL, supra note 87; Jay Hook, A Brief Life of James Bradley Thayer, 88
Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (1993).
92. White, supra note 89, at 48; Hook, supra note 91, at 1, 3.
93. See James Bradley Thayer, Our New Possessions, 12 HARv. L. REv. 464 (1899) (re-
vealing Thayer's devoted nationalism). Although he thought the nation's role in the Span-
ish-American War "discreditable," id. at 465, he nevertheless defended the power of the
national government to acquire and govern the nation's new Pacific territories. Id. at 467-73.
Successive and expanding uses of national power had been necessary to the nation's growth,
he maintained, and the Constitution had consistently found those uses warranted. The Con-
stitution was "astonishingly well adapted for the purposes of a great, developing nation"
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hung in the balance between courts and legislatures, Thayer's pri-
mary concern was that the national government remain supreme.
That central conviction, for example, informed his book on John
Marshall. Thayer praised the Chief Justice unstintingly as the
shaper of the "National Constitution," a contribution where Mar-
shall "was pre~minent-first, with no one second."' 4 Although he
wrote in 1901 at the age of seventy, memories of the Civil War still
suffused his thinking. "It was Marshall's strong constitutional doc-
trine," he declared fervently, "that saved the country from suc-
cumbing, in the great struggle of forty years ago, and kept our po-
litical fabric from going to pieces. '95
If Thayer was a Yankee Unionist forged in the heat of the
Civil War, Hand and his fellow legal progressives were middle-class
professionals galvanized emotionally by the social turmoil of the
late nineteenth century, inspired intellectually by the ideal of sci-
ence as an instrument of social progress, and shaped legally by a
distinctive set of political conflicts that consistently pitted courts
against legislatures." Much of the characteristic tone of legal pro-
gressivism, in fact, stemmed from the way it fused an intellectual
commitment to scientism and reform with a politicized view of the
institutional tensions between courts and legislatures. Legal
progressives tended to see a close and beneficent connection be-
tween science, democracy, social progress, widespread economic
welfare, and the innovative power of the legislature. Concurrently,
they tended to see a parallel, and maleficent, connection between
obscurantism, oppression, social disruption, the rights of property,
and the common law of the courts 7 Brandeis, for example, identi-
and for "the purposes of a great people." Id. at 468. The lesson was that Americans needed
to "appreciate the large scope of this great charter of our national life." Id. at 469.
Grey further illustrates Thayer's nationalism in discussing the latter's position on the
power of the federal government to issue paper money. Grey, supra note 89, at 32-36.
94. MARSHALL, supra note 87, at 58-59.
95. Id. at 58-59. Thayer shared many of the views of his friend, colleague, and fellow
Yankee, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. E.g., Grey, supra note 89, at 36-40. Holmes, who of
course also remembered the Civil War vividly, shared Thayer's view about the role of judi-
cial review: "restraint" was important but national supremacy was essential. In 1913, while
on the Supreme Court, Holmes expressed the essence of the view that united him with
Thayer and the "American Doctrine" essay: "I do not think the United States would come
to an end if we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the Union
would be emperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the laws of the several
States." OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., Law and the Court, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS
291, 295-96 (1920).
96. See generally ARNOLD M. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: Ain-
TUDES OF BAR AND BENCH 1875-1895 (1960) (focusing on legal profession's responses to the
labor and social unrest of the late nineteenth century).
97. The conflict between courts and legislatures is, of course, a perennial. The period
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fled legislatures with the scientific method of investigation and ex-
perimentation, and he charged that "the unwritten or judge-made
laws as distinguished from legislation" were "largely deaf and
blind."'98 Roscoe Pound imagined his sociological jurisprudence on
the same dichotomy. "[T]here is coming to be a science of modern
legislation," he proclaimed.99 As a result, "modern" statutes "re-
present long and patient study by experts," elaborate public dis-
cussions, "and hearings before legislative committees. '" 100 In con-
trast, the courts were "less and less competent to formulate rules
for new relations which required regulation.' 101 Indeed, Pound de-
clared, the courts had become major obstacles to rational law mak-
ing. "Judicial law-making for sheer lack of means to get at the real
situation, operates unjustly and inequitably in a complex social or-
ganization."102 In 1912, Frankfurter packed those typical progres-
sive beliefs together tightly. "Growing democratic sympathies, jus-
tified by the social message of modern scientists," he declared
sweepingly, "demand to be translated into legislation for economic
betterment.' 0 3
Hand shared those animating convictions. He was, Gunther
tells us, one of those "for whom true progressivism required na-
tional policy-making based on expertise."'04 In one of his earliest
essays, published in 1901, he criticized the partisan use of expert
testimony at trial and emphasized the inability of juries to under-
stand complex scientific issues. 0 5 "Knowledge of such general laws
can be acquired only from a specialized experience such as the or-
from approximately 1890 to 1937, however, is distinctive. The conflict ran relatively consist-
ently through the whole period. It shaped the period's dominant politics and constitutional
disputes, and it was closely tied to a historically specific set of social and economic disputes.
In addition, the period's rhetoric and self-understanding was linked to fundamental intellec-
tual assumptions about the nature of both human knowledge and social behavior.
98. Louis D. BRANDEIS, The Curse of Bigness, in THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: MISCELLANE-
OUS PAPERS OF Louis D. BRANDEIS 316, 318-19 (Osmond K. Fraenkel ed., Kinnikat Press
1965) (1934).
99. Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARv. L. REV. 383, 384 (1908).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 403.
102. Id. at 404; see also Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 469-70
(1909).
103. FELIx FRANKFURTER, The Zeitgeist and the Judiciary, Address at the Twenty-
Fifth Anniversary Dinner of the Harvard Law Review (1912), in LAW AND PoLrIcs: OCCA-
SIONAL PAPERS OF FELIx FRANKFURTER, 1913-1938, at 3, 4 (Archibald MacLeish & E.F.
Pritchard eds., 2d ed. 1962) (1939).
104. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 213; cf. id. at 312 (discussing Hand's support for the use
of court-appointed experts rather than partisan experts in complex technical cases).
105. Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testi-
mony, 15 HARv. L. REV. 40 (1901).
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dinary man does not possess,"10 he explained. When such matters
were at issue, "the jury is not a competent tribunal. '10 7 His solu-
tion was the scientific expert. "It is obvious that my path has led
to a board of experts or a single expert, not called by either side,
who shall advise the jury."'' 0 If jurors refused to follow the ex-
pert's advice, Hand continued, the court could easily rule that
"their verdict is 'against the evidence' and cannot stand."10 9
Like Pound, Brandeis, and Frankfurter, Hand adopted the
standard progressive dichotomy between courts and legislatures,
linking the former to class prejudice and the latter to scientific re-
form. Progressivism, he declared, "reflects a suspicion of courts."110
Social problems required an "experimental" approach that could
act on adequate factual grounds. The courts, however, relied only
on "the yardstick of abstract economic theory" and on the "inevi-
table bias" that suffused the judges' "individual opinions upon po-
litical or economic questions." '
The only way in which the right, or the wrong, of the matter may be shown,
is by experiment; and the legislature, with its paraphernalia of committee
and commission, is the only public representative really fitted to
experiment." 2
That compelling ground for restricting the scope of judicial review,
a quintessential element of early twentieth-century progressiv-
ism,113 was not the view of James Bradley Thayer.
There were, in fact, at least three significant differences that
separated Thayer from his later progressive apostles. First, when
Thayer wrote his "American Doctrine" essay, he still assumed that
106. Id. at 55.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 56.
109. Id. at 57.
110. Learned Hand, The Speech of Justice, 29 HARv. L. REV. 617 (1916) [hereinafter
Speech of Justice], reprinted in SPIRIT OF LIBERTY, supra note 41, at 10, 15. Hand was
initially enthusiastic about the possibilities of economic regulation through the Federal
Trade Commission. Agency action, as opposed to judicial enforcement, struck him as "clear
recognition" of "the proper mental attitude toward the trust question." GUNTHER, supra
note 1, at 246.
111. Id. at 507, 501, 508. A few years later, at the request of George Rublee, Hand
examined the Supreme Court's opinions under the Sherman Act. The results, he wrote, were
"haphazard and unscientific." GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 247. The study "confirmed his
view that courts were incompetent to develop coherent antitrust policies." Id.
112. Bight-Hour Day, supra note 74, at 495, 508.
113. Croly said essentially the same thing, for example, in the book that Hand admired
so much. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 195-96; HERBERT DAVID CROLY, THE PROMISE OF AMERI-
CAN LIFE 394-95 (Northwestern University Press 1989) (1909). Indeed, Gunther tells us, it
was Hand who helped shape Croly's views about the courts. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 194.
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the fundamental issue in American constitutional law was the rela-
tionship between states and the nation. Hand and the legal
progressives, however, located that defining issue elsewhere, in the
patterned political tensions between courts and legislatures. While
Gunther attributes Hand's inspiration in attacking Lochner v. New
Yorkl" 4 to Thayer,115 his essay in fact articulates an altered and
distinctively "progressive" Thayerism. It argues for the applicabil-
ity of the classic Thayerian "rationality" test 16 when that stan-
dard-at least as stated in the "American Doctrine" essay-did
not apply. Lochner, after all, challenged the constitutionality of a
state law. Hand's progressive concerns, however, led him to
smother the distinction between the review of state and federal ac-
tions and to apply Thayer's highly deferential rationality standard
to the former as well as the latter. Adapting Thayer to their pur-
poses, Hand and the progressives unceremoniously elided their
mentor's qualification to the rule of the clear mistake. They gener-
alized the qualification sweepingly as part of their effort to reform
society by harnessing the "deaf and blind" courts and by liberating
the "experimental" legislatures-those of the states every bit as
much as those of the nation. 17
Second, by stressing the politico-intellectual dichotomy be-
tween courts and legislatures, progressives constructed their own
special justification for Thayer's rationality standard. In their
minds, the rule of the clear mistake applied for reasons beyond the
fact that the Constitution gave Congress broad powers and broader
discretion. It also applied because the courts did not have the sci-
entific capacity to deal intelligently with social problems. Hand's
attack on Lochner, for example, made it clear that the "experimen-
tal" nature of the question required a scientific approach that was
possible only through legislative inquiry and action." 8 The courts
114. 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
115. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 118-19.
116. See Eight-Hour Day, supra note 74, at 502; see also id. at 499-503, 507-08.
117. Again, it is critical to note that Thayer's stricter standard of review was intended,
at least primarily, to protect federal power against state interference, not to protect individ-
ual rights from state regulation. The essay's double standard and stricter test for state ac-
tions could, however, have supported the more rigorous type of judicial review that progres-
sives opposed so strenuously.
118. Hand's use of the progressive "court/legislature" dichotomy marks a rich juncture
in the history of American legal thought. His essay linked Thayer's approach to the problem
of judicial review with the progressives' belief in a political and intellectual dichotomy be-
tween courts and legislatures. In doing so, it helped clear a path that would eventually lead
from Thayer to Henry Hart, the path from the origins of "judicial restraint" in the late
nineteenth century to the development of process jurisprudence in the mid-twentieth. For a
revealing look at some of the differences between the political and legal views of Thayer and
the Progressives, compare Eight-Hour Day, supra note 74, with James Bradley Thayer,
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could contribute little or nothing to the resolution of the question.
As Gunther puts it, Hand's analysis meant that "the very attempt
to evaluate the wisdom of protective laws was simply beyond the
competence of the judges.""'
Third, Thayer believed that the scope of judicial review should
be narrow because the people should govern themselves through
their elected representatives and because courts could not safe-
guard a free society.12 0 Hand and his fellow legal progressives sym-
pathized with those beliefs, but they also transformed them. While
they believed in popular government, they also believed that the
people needed the assistance of experts in order to succeed. Only
specialized agencies armed with scientific expertise could cope with
the complex and dynamic problems of the modern world, and
those agencies required flexibility if they were to carry out their
difficult assignments. 12' Progressive legal thinkers, then, favored a
strictly limited judicial review for a second reason that was foreign
to Thayer: not to enable "the people" to participate in governing
themselves and thereby to grow personally in "moral responsibil-
ity,"'. 22 but rather to enable professional experts to utilize science
on the people's behalf in order to make the machinery of govern-
ment more efficient. Those experts, unlike the courts, could safe-
guard a free society.
Before the war, then, Hand both modified Thayer and ex-
panded his doctrine in the service of his ardent and deeply felt
reform politics. While he drew on his mentor's teachings, he did
not reject "liberty of contract" merely because it violated the
American Judges and the Interests of Labor, 5 Q.J. EcON. 503 (1891).
119. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 121.
120. When Thayer referred to "the people," he meant actual citizens who ought, in a
democracy, to benefit personally from "the enlargement of ideas, the strengthening of moral
fibre, and the growth of political experience" that came from active participation in popular
government. MARSHALL, supra note 87, at 106-07.
In contrast, Progressives spoke constantly of "the people," but a significant segment of
the movement's intellectual wing were highly skeptical of the untutored wisdom of "the
people." When Hand developed his highly restrictive interpretation of the First Amendment
in 1917, for example, he referred in distinctly unflattering terms to "the people" when he
explained privately that his goal was "to withhold the torrents of passion to which I suspect
democracies will be found more subject than for example the whig autocracy of the 18th
century." GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 159. Hand did not think that juries could or would
protect the speech rights of minorities and dissidents. Id. at 157.
121. Gunther tells us relatively little about Hand's views of social "experts," but he
does make clear that, by the time of the New Deal, Hand "doubted the political neutrality
and genuine expertise of the administrative agencies." Id. at 473. Gunther notes, however,
that "in his official capacity, he deferred generously." Id.
122. MARSHALL, supra note 87, at 107. In this regard, Brandeis remained closer to
Thayer than did the others.
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proper canons of constitutional construction. He indicted it on far
broader and more substantive grounds. The ostensible protection
of "liberty of contract," he maintained, was the result of duplici-
tous and unprincipled class bias. On its merits it was an outrageous
social and economic wrong.123 Confronting the ultimate issue of so-
cial and economic inequality, Hand declared that:
for the state to intervene to make more just and equal the relative strategic
advantages .of the two parties to the contract, of whom one is under the
pressure of absolute want, while the other is not, is as proper a legislative
function as that it should neutralize 'the relative advantages arising from
fraudulent cunning or from superior physical force.
124
In a series of largely unsigned editorials for The New Republic, he
stated his views even more bluntly, accusing the courts of serving
the prejudices of their "economic class" and committing them-
selves to the preservation of "inequalities of economic power.'
25
Indeed, by 1916 Hand was even prepared to issue a plea for
his own brand of progressive judicial activism, apparently limited,
to be sure, to non-constitutional issues. In an article entitled "The
Speech of Justice," to which Gunther pays insufficient attention,
Hand rejected the idea that the judge was a mere "passive inter-
preter" of the law.126 "Conservative political opinion," he an-
nounced, "cleaves" to the belief that the judge's "absolute loyalty
to authoritative law is the price of his immunity from political
pressure and of the security of his tenure.' 27 But that "conserva-
tive opinion" was a partisan screen. "In its passionate adherence to
this tradition such opinion is not disinterested," he charged; "it
would as eagerly encourage judicial initiative, if the laws were
framed by labor unions.' 128 Although conservatives were right in
saying that the judge stood "low" in the "hierarchy of power," they
were wrong in denying that "the judge has, by custom, his own
proper representative character as a complementary organ of the
social will.' 29 In fact, Hand maintained, judges must inevitably
choose: "interpretation is a mode of the will and understanding is a
choice."' 30 They had to grapple with "the contests of their time,"
he insisted, and "ritualistic piety" could give them no refuge.' 31
123. Eight-Hour Day, supra note 65, at 497-501, 508.
124. Id. at 506.
125. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 249; see id. at 248-51.
126. Speech of Justice, supra note 110, at 10.
127. Id. at 10-11.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 11.
130. Id. at 14.
131. Id. at 15.
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"Like every public functionary, in the end they are charged with
the responsibility of choosing but of choosing well." 182 The true
and "final test" of their judicial work was their service to "a genu-
ine social ideal which shall be free from class prejudice." That test,
Hand believed, they could not avoid. 3
Thus, Hand did not simply adopt Thayer's "American Doc-
trine," nor did he find it congenial wholly for reasons of constitu-
tional logic. Rather, he expanded Thayer's ideas into a broader and
more serviceable political tool, and he used that tool vigorously to
advance the substantive political values that he cared about
deeply. In the years before World War I, "Thayerian" was for him
the adjective, not the noun.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF HAND'S FIRST
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
The defining twentieth-century constitutional dilemma for
progressives and their liberal successors has been the problem of
reconciling a commitment to certain special individual rights, most
notably those enshrined in the First Amendment, with a rejection
of the old economic "substantive" due process. Hand's historical
reputation rests largely on the uncompromising position he staked
out in the years after World War I. Judges, he came to insist,
should not interfere with legislative or executive actions that re-
stricted so-called personal rights, including those protected by the
First Amendment, any more than they should intervene to protect
"economic" rights.
A. Overview: From Masses to Dennis
Hand was an extreme case in confronting the progressive di-
lemma. Not only had he vigorously attacked "liberty of contract"
before he went on the bench, but after he became a judge he pro-
nounced as law a powerful and innovative interpretation of the
First Amendment that raised the right of free speech to a funda-
mental principle of American government. His 1917 opinion in
Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten,3 Gunther declares, "was an
132. Id.
133. One of the major gaps in Gunther's biography is its lack of any substantial discus-
sion of Hand's work on the district court bench. The book does not touch on the question of
the extent, if any, to which his pre-war progressivism affected his early judicial work, Gun-
ther does discuss one pre-war obscenity case where Hand exhibited his sympathy for free
speech. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 148-51.
134. 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
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original, penetrating analysis, an expression of an outsider's deep-
est belief about the importance of dissent in a democratic soci-
ety."13 5 Indirectly, but ultimately, it helped to inspire a substantial
expansion of constitutional civil liberties in the twentieth
century. 136
In the short run, however, the opinion was a failure. Dubious
if not obviously wrong under prevailing legal standards, it was
widely criticized by the bar and quickly reversed by the Second
Circuit.13 7 Moreover, as Hand had feared, a few months later it ap-
parently cost him promotion to the appellate court.138
In Masses, Hand construed a federal wartime measure, the Es-
pionage Act of 1917, to deny the postmaster of New York City the
power to ban a radical magazine from the United States mail.3 9 In
terms of Hand's Thayerian and First Amendment values, his effort
was a tour de force of creative synthesis, the audaciously willful
restraint of a constitutional wolf in statutory clothing. Throughout
the opinion he insisted that he was not questioning the power of
Congress, that he was straining to be faithful to its statutory lan-
guage, and that he was striving solely to effectuate its legislative
purpose.140 At the same time, he construed the statute in an excep-
tionally restrictive manner and negated what would appear to have
been its rather clear meaning and purpose. He did so by invoking
what he termed "the normal assumption of democratic govern-
ment" and "the privilege of the individual in countries dependent
upon the free expression of opinion as the ultimate source of au-
thority. 1 4 1 He did it, in other words, by creating an exceptionally
demanding legal test for proscribable speech-compelled appar-
ently by the First Amendment-and then adamantly maintaining
that "Congress had no such revolutionary purpose in view" as to
violate that fundamental standard.14 2 Consequently, he ruled, since
it was respectfully drawn, the statute did not authorize the post-
master to ban the magazine.
135. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 152.
136. As Gunther established twenty years ago, Hand's opinion contributed to the devel-
opment of a vibrant First Amendment law in the years after World War I. Gerald Gunther,
Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of
History, 27 STAN. L. REv. 719 (1975) [hereinafter Fragments of History].
137. Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917). Hand's opinion came
down in late July and was overturned in November.
138. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 152, 155, 160-61.
139. Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217, repealed by Act of June 25, 1948, ch.
645, 62 Stat. 683. GUNTHER, supra, note 1, at 151-70.
140. Masses, 244 F. at 538-40.
141. Id. at 538, 539.
142. Id. at 540.
1995]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Hand's willingness to infuse his own values into the Masses
opinion raises a number of questions, and Gunther is primarily in-
terested in those that explore the relationship between Masses and
Hand's later career. How and why did someone with such a fervent
commitment to the values of free speech come subsequently to
deny the judiciary any special or significant role in enforcing the
First Amendment? Did its author's views about judicial review or
the First Amendment change over the course of the next four de-
cades? Most particularly, how and why did the libertarian author
of Masses wind up four decades later writing an opinion in United
States v. Dennis143 that substantially minimized First Amendment
values?
Dennis, of course, was a case from another era, the Cold War.
It involved an appeal of the convictions of eleven leaders of the
Communist Party of the United States under the Smith Act, a
1940 statute that made it unlawful to teach or advocate the over-
throw of the government of the United States by force and vio-
lence. 14 Writing for the Second Circuit, Hand "restated and di-
luted the most speech-protective interpretations of Holmes's 'clear
and present danger' test" and upheld the convictions.14" The Su-
preme Court affirmed, and its plurality opinion expressly adopted
Hand's limp formulation of the appropriate constitutional test.141
Dennis, Gunther writes, "has been viewed by many as a debacle
for the First Amendment, and critics have attributed a share of the
blame to Hand's opinion.1 47
For Gunther, Hand bears little if any blame. He quickly dis-
misses the possibility that Hand's opinion was due to any change
in his views about the importance of First Amendment values.
Hand was "a lifelong believer in the First Amendment,' ' 48 Gun-
ther maintains, and his beliefs remained as strong in the 1950s as
they had been during World War I. Similarly, Gunther dismisses
the possibility that the intensities of Cold War anticommunism in-
timidated the judge. "Hand's performance in Dennis was neither a
sudden surrender to McCarthyism nor an act of cowardice.' 49 In-
143. 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd., 341 U.S. 495 (1951).
144. GUNTHER, supra, note 1 at 598-99 (summarizing Hand's opinion, 183 F.2d at 201).
145. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 599.
146. Id. at 599. Hand's formulation was that the courts "must ask whether the gravity
of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is nec-
essary to avoid the danger." Id. at 600.
147. Id. at 599. Gunther previously called Dennis "the nadir of modern civil liberties
protection." Fragments of History, supra note 136, at 752-53.
148. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 565; see id. at 281 (substantiating Hand's committment
to First Amendment ideals).
149. Id. at 603.
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stead, he concludes, the explanation for Hand's Dennis opinion is
both simple and direct. "The central answer to the puzzle of how
Hand could write so speech-restrictive an opinion as Dennis lies in
the fact that as a lower court judge, he was bound by and faithful
to Supreme Court precedents. '150
The answer is not entirely convincing. First, Hand saw the rel-
evant precedents as ambiguous and unhelpful, and Gunther him-
self declares that the judge "found no clear guidance" in them."
Second, because the precedents were ambiguous, they were capable
of supporting a more rigorous and protective standard than Hand
shaped from them. Gunther acknowledges, in fact, that Hand not
only failed to articulate a demanding test but actually "diluted the
most speech-protective interpretations" the precedents offered. 5 2
Third, Gunther notes that Hand also ignored grave weaknesses in
the record and "relied heavily on the world situation during the
Cold War. ' 153 The precedents required neither of those moves. Fi-
nally, as his technique in Masses showed, Hand knew full well how
to avoid legal rules, craft purposeful presumptions, manipulate
standards of proof, and exploit weak records. Those techniques
were equally available to him in Dennis. Indeed, as Gunther also
points out, Justice John Marshall Harlan used some of those very
same tools when he helped design from the same precedents the
Court's move toward a more speech-protective approach later in
the decade.154
More problematic than Gunther's unconvincing answer, how-
ever, is his limited consideration of what seems, at least in a histor-
ical inquiry, a different and more interesting question. Focusing on
Hand's commitment to free speech and attempting to show his
consistency during the decades after Masses, Gunther does not
puzzle over the reasons why Hand in Masses dared write his First
150. Id. at 603-04. "Hand thought his court really had no choice but to reject the de-
fendant's challenges in Dennis." Id. at 605. Gunther's explanation for Hand's Dennis opin-
ion may help explain why he stresses the fact that Hand was "writing on a blank slate" in
Masses. Id. at 152.
151. Id. at 600. Gunther notes Hand's willingness in an earlier case to follow a First
Amendment precedent he did not like. Id. at 300. However, discussing another area he also
notes that "Hand would distinguish an unappealing precedent whenever possible." Id. at
299.
152. Id. at 599; see Wirenius, supra note 55, at 516-20; Posner, supra note 55, at 516-
18.
153. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 601. See Dennis, 183 F.2d at 213.
154. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 603. Other evidence that Gunther cites to support his
defense of Hand seems of little help. Neither the fact that Hand believed that the prosecu-
tions should not have been brought nor the fact that he continued in private to advocate the
more restrictive test he had developed in Masses provide significant support for the proposi-
tion that he felt compelled by the legal precedents to decide as he did. Id. at 603-04.
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Amendment values into law in the first place. Surely, the fact that
he was acting on a "clean slate" cannot explain his heavy reliance
on the "normal assumption of democratic government," nor can it
justify the extent to which he restricted the statute and ignored
relevant case law. Although Hand may well have valued free
speech consistently over the years, in giving judicial protection to
that value it was his behavior in Masses, not in Dennis, that seems
in retrospect aberrational.
Indeed, Hand's private reflections at the time he wrote Masses
show an acute awareness that his opinion embodied an extraordi-
nary enterprise. Knowing it would be unpopular and fearing it
would cost him professionally, he wrote to his wife:
I must do the right as I see it and the thing I am most anxious about is that
I shall succeed in giving a decision absolutely devoid of any such considera-
tions [as the prospect of promotion]. There are times when the old bunk
about an independent and fearless judiciary means a good deal. This is one
of them; and if I have limitations of judgment, I may have to suffer for it,
but I want to be sure that these are the only limitations and that I have
none of character.1 55
The key fact in construing this passage is that the relevant judicial
precedents and statutory language pointed quite readily to an easy,
popular, and uncontroversial result. 5" A reasonable construction of
the statute and a faithful application of established precedents re-
quired nothing unusual in the way of either courage or integrity,
and they surely gave no cause for Hand's sense of personal crisis.
His remarks, in other words, make sense only on the assumption
that he understood full well that he was doing something far differ-
ent than merely announcing the command of established law. He
was, instead, as he knew, and as Gunther rightly emphasizes, at-
tempting a stunning and radical break with established law.
Hand's reasons for writing his Masses opinion are undoubt-
edly complex, and Gunther's explanation-the "outsider's deepest
belief" about the importance of dissent-undoubtedly contains an
important element of truth. It seems likely, however, that there
were additional and more specifically historical reasons for Hand's
aberrational decision. One was probably his keen intellectual sym-
pathy for the magazine itself. Hand was no radical, and he did not
agree with the magazine's politics; but his philosophical bent and
skeptical attitude made him appreciate the magazine's stimulating
155. Id. at 155.
156. Id. at 156-57. See David M. Rabban, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten
Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514 (1980); David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amend-
ment Doctrine, 50 U. CHi. L. REV. 1205, 1217-27 (1983).
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freshness. Indeed, he not only read it occasionally and knew its
editor personally (though not well), but only the previous year, at
the editor's request, he had written a letter that specifically de-
fended the magazine and its right to publish unpopular opinions.
A second and related reason for his decision was the fact that his
intellectual enthusiasm for reform was at its peak. He was in-
tensely involved with The New Republic and excited by the pos-
sibilities it promised for a new kind of philosophical political de-
bate. 5" Indeed, only the year before Masses, in his article "The
Speech of Justice," Hand had undertaken the task of articulating a
new kind of progressive judicial activism on behalf of a true "social
ideal." 5 9
This combination of political enthusiasm, the inspiration of a
community of intellectual activists, and an exhilirating flirtation
with the idea of developing a new and activist progressive jurispru-
dence may well have been primary determinants behind Hand's
behavior in Masses. In his 1916 article "The Speech of Justice" he
rejected the idea of a passive judiciary and urged judges "to show a
more enlightened sympathy with the deeper aspirations of the
time."'160 There was a "genuine social ideal" that should be the
true test of their work. "Life overflows its moulds and the will out-
strips its own universals," he wrote in the ringing tones of pre-war
progressive exuberance. 6' "Men cannot know their own meaning
till the variety of its manifestations is disclosed in its final im-
pacts.'1 62 In retrospect, the essay reads like Hand's brief in sup-
port of his opinion in Masses. The two were written only a year
apart, and in addressing the Espionage Act in Masses Hand surely
tried "to show a more enlightened sympathy" and accepted, as
well, the responsibility "of choosing well." Read together, as the
essay and the opinion should be, the gulf between Masses and
Dennis widens, and the former, not the latter, emerges as the spe-
cial case.
Gunther's inattention to the aberrational aspect of Masses
suggests not only his determination to show that his subject was a
157. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 153-55. This, of course, raises a rather obvious ethical
problem-at least under current standards-in Hand's decision to hear the magazine's suit.
Gunther passes over the issue.
158. Id. at 241-51.
159. Speech of Justice, supra note 110, at 10-15. In the decade before the war liberta-
rian ideas were in circulation among a number of important law writers, though they had
little impact on the courts. See David M. Rabban, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten
Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514, 559-79 (1980-81).





consistent supporter of free speech but also his own occasional lack
of interest in the fact and process of historical change. 6 3 Only ad-
miration for Hand and the First Amendment and an excessive con-
centration on showing consistency over time can explain the extent
to which he accepts Masses as the product of an essentially un-
changing personal philosophy and psychology. The opinion was at
least equally the product of a specific and compelling historical
context. To the extent that those other historically contingent fac-
tors did help induce Hand to act, the path from Masses to Dennis
becomes more complicated than Gunther estimates.
Even considering the question that primarily interests Gun-
ther-how did Hand move from Masses to Dennis when his com-
mitment to free speech remained unchanged?-a sharper historical
answer is possible. Two factors, one narrow and specific and the
other quite broad and complex, seem to explain the path Hand
took. The first factor was simply Hand's lack of sympathy for the
defendants in Dennis. He did not see them as the kind of weak or
unfairly ensnared individuals with whom he could identify. 164
Rather, they constituted a group, and they were parts of a larger
group with powerful international resources. Quite simply, it
seems, in the context of the early Cold War, Hand regarded the
defendants as sufficiently dangerous to warrant the government in
stopping their activities.6 5 The second, and more complex, factor
was that by the 1940s Hand's views about politics, judicial review,
and the social role of the courts had changed substantially from
what they had been before World War I.
163. Gunther's inattention to history raises unnecessary questions about his case for
Hand's consistency. Discussing his attitude toward a case in 1913, for example, Gunther
relies on a statement Hand made in 1943. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 149.
164. This is not to suggest that, because the precedents do not fully explain Dennis, it
was therefore the result of "cowardice" or a "surrender to McCarthyism." Id. The point is,
rather, that Hand himself saw no reason to strain for these particular defendants. Although
he remained committed to the values of free speech, he "never doubted the need for Ameri-
can firmness in the face of Stalinist foreign policy." Id. at 578. As early as 1920 he had
called Bolshevik rule a "militant oligarchy" and "an intolerable government." Id. at 356,
357. Hand's views about the political significance of revolutionary advocacy had changed
since Masses. Vincent Blasi, Learned Hand and the Self-Government Theory of the First
Amendment: Masses Publishing Co. v. Patton, 61 U. COLo. L. REV. 1, 37 n.149 (1990). In
contrast, he did exhibit considerable sympathy for other, more sympathetic victims of the
McCarthy period, even those implicated in espionage. He found ways to lend them judicial
assistance, even when the law did not seem to favor them. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 592-98,
612-25.
165. Hand not only relied on material outside of the record, but at crucial points he
identified the court with the government (using "we" and "our" repeatedly), stressed that
the Communist leaders habitually "masked" their true intentions, and described their views




B. Processes of Change: 1917-1942
Tracing changes in Hand's thought is a complex challenge.
Many of his basic attitudes seem to have been present from his
college and law school years. Early on, for example, he showed
himself a philosophical skeptic and value relativist who believed in
the virtues of cultural tolerance, intellectual honesty, democratic
freedom, and the spiritual-as opposed to the strictly eco-
nomic-liberty of the individual. Moreover, he was a highly sophis-
ticated thinker who fully recognized the complex nature of law and
the judicial process. Consequently, when he addressed those sub-
jects, his comments were almost invariably qualified and modu-
lated. Similarly, his formal constitutional orientation changed rela-
tively little. At the beginning of his legal career he learned the
doctrine of judicial deference, 66 and progressivism seared into his
mind the dangers and duplicities of an activist judiciary. And yet,
change he did. As his outlook and ideas subtly shifted in nuance
and tendency, his jurisprudence evolved and hardened.
1. Personal and Professional Transformation: World War I
and its Immediate Aftermath. For Hand, the decade after World
War I seems to have been a time when his personal, political, and
professional self-identity was reshaped and then solidified. He had
lost faith in Roosevelt and the Progressive Party by 1916,167 and
then during and immediately after the war he split with Croly and
his friends at The New Republic.' 68 His hopes for a new kind of
intellectualized politics crumbled, and Hand was left without foun-
dation for any significant reform position. During the same years
the tensions in his marriage reached their peak of intensity, and he
166. A psychohistorian might speculate that Thayer was, after all, Hand's "father in
the law."
167. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 239-41.
168. Id. ("What began in 1916 as a disagreement about the presidential candidates
would culminate three years later in sharply conflicting positions on the acceptability of the
Treaty of Versailles."). Curiously, Gunther tells us almost nothing about Hand's attitude
toward the war itself. One might speculate that, like so many of his contemporaries, he was
repulsed by its stupidity and butchery. If so, that might help explain the increasingly pessi-
mistic turn that Hand's thinking took in the twenties. Unfortunately, however, Gunther
provides no evidence suggesting that this happened. Indeed, the war's main impact seems to
have been to stir Hand's patriotism and his desire to somehow participate. He received
permission from his senior judge to take a leave of absence and promptly told the State
Department that he "would be glad to undertake that work if the Department thinks fit."
Id. at 256. He tried to secure a position with the administration during the war and to
obtain an appointment on the American delegation to the Paris Peace Conference after-




confronted his wife directly about her distinct and separate life
style. He pressed her to spend more time with him, but she refused
and Hand finally acquiesced.1 6 9 In the single matter that was ap-
parently most central to his. personal life, he was forced into a pro-
foundly deferential posture. At the same time, he began his ascent
into the professional elite, developing new interests, friendships,
and working relationships. The prestigious, technical, and staid
American Law Institute began to occupy a significant place in his
life and work. 17 0 If Gunther is correct in believing that Hand's
friendships were critical in shaping his political views,' 7 ' as he ap-
pears to be, it seems likely that this social, personal, and profes-
sional reorientation helped Hand shed the ideals and concerns that
had marked his pre-war progressivism.
As early as 1921, in fact, Hand was looking back on his pro-
gressivism with nostalgia. Although he still believed that "a good
test" of "the people" was "their courage in protecting the weak
and controlling the rapacious," his tone was wistful and his mood
resigned. 7 2
And still at times I can have the hope that in America time may at length
mitigate our fierce individualism, may teach us the knowledge we so sorely
lack that each of us must learn to realize himself more in our communal life
whose formal expression is and as I believe will continue to be the law.17
He hoped, but no longer with any noticeable expectation of fulfill-
ment. It was unlikely that any "conversion" could "abate the in-
tensity of our own wills," he admitted, adding ominously that "the
cloven hoof will show however well the bestial heart be covered."'
1 74
2. Constitutional Turning Points, 1917-1925. Gunther is par-
ticularly illuminating in identifying two major constitutional devel-
opments that accelerated the process of change. One was the fate
of Hand's Masses test. The other was the emergence of a new kind
of liberal judicial activism.
Gunther stresses Hand's conviction that the "incitement" test
169. Id. at 183-89.
170. Id. at 408-15.
171. Id. at 190.
172. Learned Hand, Address of Learned Hand, in 3 LECTURES ON LEGAL Topics 1921-
1922, at 105 (MacMillan 1926).
173. Id. at 106.
174. Id. Although Hand remained in contact with The New Republic into the early
1920s, he had essentially stopped writing for it by the end of the war. His last unsigned
editorial appeared in 1923, and it was characteristically an attack on one of the Court's most
extreme "liberty of contract" decisions, Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 251.
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he set forth in Masses was both drastically different from Holmes's
"clear and present danger" test and far superior to it as a method
of protecting free speech. Essentially, Hand argued in
Masses-and thereafter in private-that the First Amendment
should protect a speaker unless the actual words she used, fairly
considered, constituted a direct "incitement" to commit a crime.
The test was not only highly restrictive, but it also made the ques-
tion a matter of law for the court. Hand understood the "clear and
present danger" test, in contrast, to require a judgment of future
probabilities and facts. Such a test, he believed, was ambiguous
and speculative, and it placed the decision in the hands of a jury.
On both counts it would likely prove much less protective than
would a judge applying his "incitement" test.175
Pivotal to the development of Hand's thinking, Gunther per-
ceptively suggests, was the decisive difference he saw between the
two tests: not the degree of protection they promised, but the
scope of judicial authority they defined. "Once you admit that the
matter is one of degree," as Holmes's test did, Hand reasoned, de-
termination of First Amendment questions became "a matter of
administration," that is, a question to be decided by a practical
estimate of probabilities. 6 In Hand's mind, such a judgment was
"legislative" and "executive," but not judicial. If such was the test,
he believed, then the courts exercised only a narrow authority in
applying it and had little choice but to defer. In contrast, he be-
lieved that his "absolute and objective test," focusing on the spe-
cific language the speaker had used, created a question of law.
Such a question did not require judicial deference. Thus, in his
mind, the rejection of his "incitement" test and acceptance of
Holmes's "clear and present danger" test had a broad and special
import. It meant that First Amendment issues were properly de-
termined under an essentially deferential standard.1 77
Although the Second Circuit rejected his Masses opinion,
Hand continued to urge the "incitement" test on Holmes and
others during the years immediately after the war. He seemed to
have no success. By 1921 he feared his Masses test had proven a
175. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 157-70. See Fragments of History, supra note 136, at
721. For Hand's articulation in Masses see 244 F. 535, 540-42 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 246 F. 24
(2d Cir. 1917).
176. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 169.
177. In Dennis, Hand affirmed the decision of the trial judge to withdraw from the jury
"all questions regarding the constitutionality of the Act." 183 F.2d at 215-16. Athough the
critical question under the "clear and present danger" test was "not a question of fact at
all," he wrote, it was nevertheless "[o]rdinarily" one "for a legislature." Id. at 215. Under
the Act, he wrote, Congress delegated the power to make ultimately legislative judgments in
this area to the courts. Id.
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"false coin," and two years later he claimed to be resigned to its
demise. "I have not much hope," he wrote, "that my own views as
stated in the Masses case would ever be recognized as law."'17 8
By the mid-twenties, then, Hand knew his "incitement" test
had been rejected, and he believed it was buried. His faith in the
test and his conviction that it was necessary to protect free speech
combined to make the rival "clear and present danger" test seem
to him particularly weak, uncertain, and manipulable. Those views
also made him feel acutely the lack of "judicial" authority to over-
ride legislative and executive judgments in First Amendment cases.
Thus, some thirty years later in Dennis, even though the prece-
dents might have been confused and unhelpful, Hand was never-
theless constrained by his conviction that-whatever else they
might mean-they did impose a deferential standard and limit the
court severely.179
In addition to the import of Hand's failed "incitement" test, a
second legal development contributed to hardening his ideas aboutjudicial review. Gunther pinpoints the Supreme Court's 1923 deci-
sion in Meyer v. Nebraska'"0 as a "watershed" event in the pro-
cess."s" The question in Meyer and a companion case was the con-
stitutionality of several state statutes that prohibited the teaching
of certain languages, principally German, in primary schools.
Clearly, the statutes intruded into education, discriminated against
certain groups, and limited free speech and thought. Just as
clearly, they were popular responses to significant public concerns
and sought to achieve such "rational" goals as making "English" a
widely understood language in the states and fostering the teach-
ing of "American ideals" to immigrants.182 In Meyer the Court de-
clared that the term "liberty" in the Fourteenth Amendment in-
cluded not just the right to make contracts but also a series of
rights "essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men." 83 On the ground that the statutes violated those rights, the
Court held them unconstitutional.
For more than a quarter of a century progressives and their
178. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 170 (citing letter from Learned Hand to Zechariah
Chafee, Jr. (Jan. 2, 1921)).
179. Hand was still acutely conscious of his Masses test and, consequently, of the weak-
ness of the "clear and present danger" test. "Hand's contemporaneous correspondence [dur-
ing Dennis] makes it clear that he continued to adhere to the essence of his Masses test of
1917." Id. at 604.
180. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). There was also a companion case, Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S.
404 (1923).
181. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 376-77.
182. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401.
183. Id. at 399.
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liberal successors had attacked substantive due process. Meyer,
however, gave them pause. "For the first time," Gunther explains,
"substantive due process had been used to reach a result liberals
could cheer.1 4 As a result, the case "divided liberals, on the Court
and off, in a way that has still never been healed." 18 5 Indeed,
Holmes and Brandeis split, the former dissenting and the latterjoining the majority. Soon their split "echoed throughout the civil
liberties community." 8 6 As new issues arose, "the Meyer precedent
prompted liberals to look to the courts for the protection of those
personal rights they cherished."'81 7 Some, however, refused, and
both Hand and Frankfurter sided with Holmes. They "had battled
too long against quasi-political due-process rulings," Gunther
writes, "to turn now to an opportunistic embracing of what they
considered to be an illegitimate constitutional tool."'"8
As liberals debated the issue, the temptation of judicial activ-
ism grew. Only two years after Meyer, in Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters,8 9 the Court again applied substantive due process to defeat
"the rabid Americanization movement" and to protect the rights of
parents to control the upbringing of their children. 90 This time,
too, the decision was unanimous. Holmes as well as Brandeis
joined the majority.
Gunther argues that Hand, in an exchange of letters with
Lippmann, made a fundamental decision in the mid-twenties to re-
ject such liberal judicial activism. As Pierce came down, the stage
was being set for the famous Tennessee "monkey trial," where the
American Civil Liberties Union was challenging a state statute that
prohibited public school employees from teaching Darwinism in
their classes. Lippmann supported the A.C.L.U. effort and denied
that "[s]uch foolishness should be within the province of the legis-
lature."'191 He acknowledged what he was rejecting. "Now I know
this is progressive dogma as we all accepted it in the days when the
courts were knocking out the laws we wanted."'1 2 But the context
of American politics had changed. "I wonder whether we don't
have to develop some new doctrine to protect education from ma-jorities." In fact, Lippmann concluded, "the fierce ignorance of
184. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 377.
185. Id. at 376.
186. Id. at 377.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
190. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 378-79.





these millions of semiliterate priestridden and parsonridden peo-
ple," made it necessary to find ways to "confine the actions of ma-
jorities." 193 Hand disagreed. "I think you are wrong," he bluntly
told Lippmann. "Ignorance may yet overwhelm us but I am laying
my odds against it." The lure of "liberal" substantive due process,
Gunther concludes, "was ultimately negated by his belief in the
democratic process."'91 4
Hand's faith in democracy was especially salient in recon-
firming his commitment to the old "progressive dogma" because
Lippmann openly acknowledged that his move toward substantive
due process was rooted in his rapidly escalating doubts about the
basic viability of democratic government. "My own mind," he told
Hand privately, "has been getting steadily antidemocratic."' 9 5 In-
deed, in two contemporaneous and influential books, Lippmann se-
verely questioned and then rejected the "false ideal" of popular
government. 196 When Lippmann personified the clear connection
between the lure of liberal substantive due process and acceptance
of overtly antidemocratic values, he confirmed for Hand the demo-
cratic authenticity of the old "progressive dogma." Lippmann's ex-
ample steeled his growing determination to reject liberal substan-
tive due process by confirming for him its express antidemocratic
premises and implications.1 9 7
3. Wavering: 1925-1926. The events of the early and mid-
twenties-the withering of progressivism, ascension into the pro-
fessional elite, the fate of his "incitement" test, and his reaction
against Lippmann and Meyer-began to rigidify Hand's ideas
about judicial review. Although Gunther does not note their signif-
icance, he discusses two episodes that reveal that Hand's ideas in
the mid-1920s were still not irrevocably fixed.
One was his reaction to Gitlow v. New York."' There, the Su-
preme Court for the first time accepted the idea that the concept
of "liberty" in the Fourteenth Amendment "incorporated" the
193. Id.
194. Id. at 383 (citing letter from Learned Hand to Walter Lippmann (June 10, 1925)
(from Lippmann Papers, Yale University L-23 (photocopy in Hand Papers))).
195. Id. at 382 (citing letter from Walter Lippmann to Learned Hand (June 8 or 9,
1925)).
196. Id. at 383-86. The books were WALTER J. LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION (Harcourt &
Brace 1922) and WALTER J. LIPPMANN, THE PHANTOM PUBLIC (Harcourt & Brace 1925).
197. Hand's commitment to his idea of democracy and his rejection of Lippmann's con-
trary views persisted into the fifties. See RONALD STEEL, WALTER LIPPMANN AND THE AMERI-
CAN CENTURY 493-96 (1st ed. 1980).
198. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
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rights protected by the First Amendment."9 While the majority
applied a weak version of the "clear and present danger" test to
uphold a conviction under a state criminal syndicalism statute,
Holmes and Brandeis dissented. They accepted incorporation of
the First Amendment into the Fourteenth, advocated a far more
speech-protective version of the "clear and present danger" test,
found the words at issue insufficient to sustain the conviction, and
proposed a radically expanded concept of the constitutional scope
of free speech.100 Hand responded to their dissent with enthusiasm.
Had he been on the Court, he told a colleague, "I should join in
[Holmes's] dissent." Indeed, he declared, without some such ap-
proach as the dissent set forth "the whole doctrine of free speech
goes by the board."201 Thus, in the same year that he told Lipp-
mann he was "wrong" about substantive due process, Hand still
entertained some commitment to special judicial protection for
free speech.
The second indication of flexibility came the following year in
a tribute Hand wrote for Holmes. There were, he explained, "two
schools" of thought on the scope of judicial review.2 02 One was pre-
pared "to impose upon the Constitution the fundamental political
assumptions which for the time being are dominant. ' '20 3 The
other-the Holmesian-believed in contrast that "almost any ex-
periment is in the end less dangerous than its suppression. '"20 4
Hand's formulation revealed his residual ambivalence. By declar-
ing that the Holmesian school "does not depart from the first
[school] in theory but in application is more cautious, 205 he left
room for some specialized but still significant element of judicial
activism. Further, by defining the Holmesian school as opposed to
"suppression" and committed to the relative desirability of "al-
most any experiment," 206 he seemed to justify its position on a the-
199. Id. at 666; see, e.g., HENRY J. ABRAHAM & BARBARA A. PERRY, FREEDOM AND THE
COURT: CIVIL RIGHTS AND LMERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES, 52-53 (6th ed. 1994).
200. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 672-73 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
201. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 281 (citing letter from Learned Hand to Charles Merrill
Hough (July 9, 1926)); see also William P. LaPiana, Thoughts and Lives, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REv. 607 (1994) (dissecting the evolution of Holmes's thinking). Compare GUNTHER, supra
note 1, at 281 with G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE
INNER SELF 438-45 (Oxford Univ. Press 1993) (discussing the evolution of Holmes's think-
ing). Apparently, Hand did not leave a record as to his views on the other critical early cases
that incorporated the First Amendment into the Fourteenth.
202. Learned Hand, Mr. Justice Holmes at Eighty-Five, N.Y. WORLD, Mar. 8, 1926, at







ory that could offer special protections for speech. Both of those
implications were consistent with his statement the previous year
that he would have joined Holmes's dissent in Gitlow.
4. Rigidification: The Cumulating Burdens of History, 1927-
1942. If Hand retained some residual commitment to the judicial
protection of First Amendment rights in the mid-1920s, his enthu-
siasm shrivelled during the next fifteen years to little more than a
faint personal preference. Between approximately 1927 and 1942, a
series of developments set his hardening views in stone. Five seem
of primary importance.
First, the 1920s and 1930s witnessed a powerful intellectual as-
sault on democratic ideas, °7 and Hand's faith in popular govern-
ment shrank in response. Though his belief in democracy helped
fire his disagreement with Lippmann's express challenge, Hand
surrendered a good deal to his old friend. As did many intellectuals
in the 1920s, he abandoned optimistic ideals of popular govern-
ment and accepted a harsher and more "realistic" version. In 1929
he announced his fundamental break from his earlier progressivism
in a speech he gave to the American Law Institute. There, he spe-
cifically rejected the premise of his 1916 plea for a progressive ju-
risprudence and denied both the legitimacy and existence of any
"social will" that could serve as a non-positivistic moral norm. The
very idea of such a "common will" was "a fiction," he an-
nounced.208 "The truth appears to be that what we mean by a com-
mon will is no more than that there shall be an available peaceful
means by which law may be changed when it becomes irksome to
enough powerful people who can make their will effective. '20 9 The
next year he stated a hard corollary. "Liberty is so much latitude
as the powerful choose to accord the weak." 10 By 1932 he was
echoing the thesis Lippmann himself had advanced in his books
attacking democracy. "[M]en often answer for reasons quite alien
to the issue," he declared; "they seldom have anything that can
truly be called an opinion. '21
Hand's narrowed and "realistic" view of democracy helped al-
207. EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURAL-
ISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 15-114 (Univ. of Ky. Press 1973).
208. Learned Hand, Is There a Common Will?, 28 MICH. L. REV. 46 (1929) [hereinafter
Common Will], reprinted in SPmrr OF LIBERTY, supra note 41, at 36, 40.
209. Id. at 41.
210. Learned Hand, Sources of Tolerance, 79 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1930) [hereinafter
Sources of Tolerance], reprinted in SPIRIT OF LIBERTY, supra note 41, at 51, 55.
211. Learned Hand, Democracy: Its Presumptions and Realities, FED. B. ASS'N J., Mar.




ter his jurisprudence in three ways. First, the "realistic" view led
him to reject the idea of a "common will" existing independent of
positive law and hence left him with no basis on which to claim
that a judge could legitimately seek to enforce some higher "social
ideal." Second, since law was nothing but the result of shifting bal-
ances among powerful individuals and groups, there was no way a
judge could improve on the practical compromises that democratic
politics reached. Accordingly, he concluded, "the path of temper-
ance and of wisdom is to leave the solution to the other organs of
government where the opposing interests may more adequately
count in their mutual impact. 11 2 Third, as he abandoned his opti-
mistic ideas of democracy, he apparently lost his faith in the vi-
brant democratic justification for judicial review that he had in-
fused into Masses. As long as he conceived of the First
Amendment as a structural necessity for democratic government,
he had a justification for providing special judicial protection to
speech that transcended the individual's "liberty" interest and
that was constitutionally distinguishable from a mere "liberal"
substantive due process. 213 When he lost faith in the practicability
of truly popular government, he also seemed to lose faith in his
structural justification for free speech as well. Those new assump-
tions counselled judicial passivity, and by the end of the 1920s
Hand began preaching not reform but rather "a duty to
preserve. 2 1 4
Second, the rise of fascism in his beloved Italy during the
1920s began to disturb Hand deeply.215 As early as 1927 he lumped
Mussolini with Stalin as a threat to human freedom,216 and the
following year he charged that their commitment to "far-reaching
programs" of social reconstruction made the two dictators unalter-
able enemies of human freedom. By 1932 he was defending Ameri-
can democracy "with all its defects" because, at a minimum, "it
gives a bloodless measure of social forces. '21 7 Referring to his vaca-
tions in Italy, he confessed that "I have been where this was not
212. Learned Hand, To Yale Law Graduates, Address at the Yale Law School Gradua-
tion (June 17, 1931) [hereinafter Yale Address], in SPIRIT OF LIBERTY, supra note 41, at 65,
68.
213. See Vincent Blasi, Learned Hand and the Self-Government Theory of the First
Amendment: Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 61 U. COLo. L. REv. 1 (1990); Robert M.
Cover, The Left, the Right, and the First Amendment, 40 MD. L. REv. 349 (1981).
214. Common Will, supra note 208, at 43.
215. Italy was Hand's favorite country, and he spent much time there in the 1920s and
1930s. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 371-72. For his general views about totalitarianism, see id.
at 442-44.
216. Preservation of Personality, supra note 41, at 28.
217. Democracy, supra note 211, at 76.
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true; in lands where one felt the pervasive foreboding of violence,
of armed suppression."21 8 The emergence of Nazism in the 1930s
only strengthened his belief that "totalitarianism" presented a po-
tentially fatal challenge. He urged American efforts to counter Ger-
man expansionism, agonized over the foreign policy crises of the
late thirties, and after 1939 strongly endorsed military action
against Hitler.21 9 The "totalitarians," he announced in early 1941,
"in the end will fail. '220
The rise of totalitarianism was significant for Hand's views
about judicial review. The political and intellectual challenges it
raised moved him to embrace whole-heartedly a theory of demo-
cratic government that was founded philosophically on an extreme
intellectual skepticism about human values and politically on an
unwavering faith in the ultimate virtue of expedient compromise
and social stability. Justice, he explained, meant nothing but a
"tolerable compromise," the only alternative to "the rule of the
tooth and claw."221 Hand had long been both a skeptic and a prag-
matist, but the political and intellectual crisis of the thirties trans-
formed those characteristics into a compelling politico-moral ideol-
ogy. On the side of evil, it identified totalitarian repression with
absolutistic, non-empirical, and non-majoritarian values; and, on
the side of good, it identified individual freedom and democratic
government with the kind of tentative, tolerant, relativistic, and
experimental attitudes that Hand had long found congenial.222 To-
talitarianism and a relativist theory of democracy led Hand to cat-
egorize judicial review not merely as anti-majoritarian or danger-
ous but, more decisively, as incompatible with the fundamental
prerequisite of democratic government, acceptance of the "tolera-
ble compromise" that held off "the rule of the tooth and claw."
Third, as Hand was increasingly drawn into and absorbed by
the problem of statutory construction, his view of the appropriate
judicial role seemed to change. Although Gunther would appar-
ently disagree with that claim, he does note that Hand's judicial
work came increasingly to deal with problems of statutory con-
struction.223 Over the years, Hand developed a special interest in
218. Id. at 76; see id. at 73.
219. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 479-93.
220. Learned Hand, Liberty, YALE ALUMNI MAG., June 6, 1941, at 10 [hereinafter Lib-
erty], reprinted in SpnuRT OF LIBERTY, supra note 41, at 109, 117.
221. Yale Address, supra note 212, at 68. The "tooth and claw" image was a favorite of
Hand's. See, e.g., Chief Justice Stone, supra note 62, at 157.
222. See, e.g., Sources of Tolerance, supra note 210, at 51-64; Democracy, supra note
211, at 70-79. Hand's response was typical of many American intellectuals. PURCELL, supra
note 207, at 117-38, 197-217.
223. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 466.
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statutory construction and gradually earned a reputation as a
master of the craft. His constant grappling with the problem seems
to have led him to a greater respect for the complexities involved
and to embrace more firmly an ideal of strict fidelity to statutory
purposes. "But the judge must always remember," he wrote in
1933
that he should go no further than he is sure the government would have
gone, had it been faced with the case before him. If he is in doubt, he must
stop, for he cannot tell that the conflicting interests in the society for which
he speaks would have come to a just result, even though he is sure that he
knows what the just result should be. He is not to substitute even his juster
will for theirs; otherwise it would not be the common will which prevails,
and to that extent the people would not govern.2 2 4
The change in Hand's views about statutory construction
helps, in particular, to explain much of the difference between his
opinions in Masses and Dennis. Masses was not, after all, simply
creative and activist. It was also Thayerian; that is, it was in form
highly deferential to the legislature.2 5 Throughout, Hand carefully
preserved the image of nearly absolute congressional authority and
avoided any hint of a conflict between the statute and the Consti-
tution. In substance, however, he simply poured his own values di-
rectly into the statute and identified his conclusions with the in-
tent of the legislature. His first major attempt to resolve the
dilemma of progressive judicial review relied on a jurisprudential
oxymoron, designing deference. The contrast between Masses and
Dennis does not reside primarily in any change in Hand's formal
theory of judicial review or the First Amendment but in his unwill-
ingness to rest again on a purposeful fiction. That change, in turn,
seems in part the result of his altered view of the nature of judicial
fidelity in the task of statutory construction.
Fourth, while the Supreme Court's conservative activism had
224. Learned Hand, How Far is a Judge Free in Rendering a Decision? (CBS radio
broadcast, May 14, 1933), in NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL ON RADIO IN EDUC., LAW SERIES I,
at 1 (1935), reprinted in SPIRIT OF LIBERTY, supra note 41, at 79, 84. Even in his first years
as a judge, Hand recognized "that his first duty is honestly to try to get at the legislative
meaning when it is written." GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 237 (quoting a letter written by
Hand to civil liberties lawyer Gilbert E. Roe). What changed over the years was the personal
intensity with which Hand felt this "duty." See generally Archibald Cox, Judge Learned
Hand and the Interpretation of Statutes, 60 HARv. L. REv. 370 (1947).
225. Hand even included a covert bow to Thayer by citing the Legal Tender Cases, 79
U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870), as support for the existence of broad congressional powers in
time of war. Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 538 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 246 F. 24
(2d Cir. 1917). Compare James Bradley Thayer, Legal Tender, 1 HARV. L. REV. 73, re-




long distressed Hand, his concerns about the role and vulnerability
of the judiciary escalated sharply in the 1930s. The frequency with
which the Court invalidated New Deal legislation struck him as
both unwarranted and foolish, and he began to refer derisively to
the four stalwartly "conservative" Justices as the "Battalion of
Death." '226 When Roosevelt announced his "Court-packing" propo-
sal in January of 1937, it strengthened Hand's persistent fear that
activist judicial review would ultimately destroy the independence
of the judiciary. He opposed Roosevelt's proposal, but he believed
that the conservative Justices had fairly called the wrath of the
administration and people down on themselves.
When the Court seemed to reverse itself only months after
Roosevelt presented his proposal, Hand was pleased with the re-
sult but disturbed by what it revealed about the dangers of judicial
review. He "viewed the Court's change of course-welcome as it
was as a matter of constitutional doctrine," Gunther explains, "as
a confirmation of his deepest misgivings about the increasingly
politicized nature of judicial review. '227 The entire episode con-
firmed his belief that the only proper way to preserve an indepen-
dent judiciary was to prevent the courts from intruding themselves
into matters that were debatable, political, and properly
legislative.228
Fifth, and by far the most intimate, was Hand's failure to
achieve the ultimate prize, appointment to the Supreme Court. He
had come close and missed once before, but in 1942 he seemed to
be the leading contender. At sixty-nine, his age was a major strike
against him, and it meant that this chance would be his last.
Frankfurter, his long-time friend and one of the President's closest
advisors, was orchestrating an all-out campaign on his behalf.
Roosevelt, however, passed over him, and Hand was crushed. Eight
years later he was able to confess the agonizing truth to Frank-
furter: "I can say it now without the shame that I suppose I should
feel-I longed as the thing beyond all else that I craved to get a
place on [the Court]. Don't, for God's sake, say I have done as
well. 229
Gunther's discussion of Hand's failure is astute and, though
unavoidably speculative, probably correct.230 Hand did not fail, as
226. Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Alexander Bickel and the Post-Realist Constitution, 11
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 521, 523 (1976) (quoting letter from Felix Frankfurter to Alexander
M. Bickel, Feb. 13, 1958, FRANKFURTER PAPERS, Library of Congress, box 65, folder 1265).
227. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 462.
228. Id. at 457-60.
229. Quoted in id. at 569.
230. Id. at 553-72.
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many thought, primarily because of his advanced age, but for more
complex reasons. Essentially, Gunther suggests that Roosevelt
doubted Hand was the kind of liberal he wanted on the Court and
that Frankfurter's campaign reinforced the President's doubts and
contributed to Hand's failure. The central dynamic, Gunther be-
lieves, revolved around the controversial "flag-salute" case handed
down in 1940,231 Frankfurter's declining influence on the Court,
and the emergence of a liberal activist bloc led by Chief Justice
Harlan F. Stone and the Court's outspoken New Dealers, Justices
Hugo L. Black, William 0. Douglas, and Frank Murphy. Gunther
speculates that Frankfurter campaigned so relentlessly for Hand in
part because he needed Hand's support to maintain his disinte-
grating position on the Court and on the constitutionality of the
flag salute. And Hand, he notes, "would probably have sided with
Frankfurter on the civil liberties issues dividing the New Deal
Court. '232 When Roosevelt picked Wiley Rutledge, a liberal ac-
tivist, instead of Hand, he set up Frankfurter's most humiliating
defeat and helped to launch the Court on a more activist course.
Within months of Rutledge's appointment the Court endorsed
Stone's "preferred freedoms" approach and repudiated Frank-
furter's three-year old flag-salute opinion.23 Eight Justices formed
the majority, while Frankfurter dissented passionately and alone.
Although Gunther does not draw the inference, it seems likely
that Hand's failure to get on the Court in 1942 contributed to the
hardening of his attitude toward judicial review, not because it
caused resentment, but because it compelled recommitment. As
Gunther does show, Hand sensed that the root cause of his failure
was Roosevelt's recognition that Hand's values and attitudes were
not what the President wanted on the Court.234 If those deeply-felt
views about politics and the judicial process had kept him off the
Court, and if his opportunity for the ultimate prize had passed for-
ever, what then remained for him but to prove himself scrupu-
lously true to those controversial views that had cost him so
dearly?
In retrospect, Hand may have sealed his fate with a speech he
gave in late 1942, while he was apparently still under consideration
231. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
232. GuNTHER, supra note 1, at 565.
233. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). For a superb
analysis of Frankfurter's decisions in the "flag-salute" cases, see Richard Danzig, How Ques-
tions Begot Answers in Felix Frankfurter's First Flag Salute Opinion, 1977 SuP. CT. REv.
257; Richard Danzig, Justice Frankfurter's Opinions in the Flag Salute Cases: Blending
Logic and Psychologic in Constitutional Decisionmaking, 36 STAN. L. REv. 675 (1984).
234. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 568.
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for the Court. In "The Contribution of an Independent Judiciary
to Civilization" he seemed to go out of his way to address the ques-
tion of judicial activism and to set himself uncompromisingly
against it.2s5 In a striking passage, ambiguous in its references but
explosive in its implications, he declared:
To interject into the process [of construing statutes] the fear of displeasure
or the hope of favor of those who can make their will felt, is inevitably to
corrupt the event, and could never be proposed by anyone who really com-
prehended the issue. This was long held a truism, but it must be owned that
the edge of our displeasure at its denial has of late been somewhat turned.
In the name of a more loyal fealty to the popular will, we are asked to de-
feat the only means by which that will can become articulate and be made
effective. To this, the first aspect of our question, I submit that there is but
one answer: an unflinching resistance.238
If Hand failed to reach the Court because of his views, he would
proclaim them only more fervently.
Hand's 1942 speech seemed, in fact, to mark the completion of
the rigidification that overtook his thinking about judicial review.
Here, he set out all the essentials of his later judicial philosophy,
placed squarely in the compelling framework of an intensely-felt
relativist theory of democracy. He declared that "values are incom-
mensurable. 2 37 He praised "compromise" as the basis for resolving
all conflicts and hailed strict judicial fidelity to those compromises
as the only enduring basis for peace and justice. When courts
twisted and stretched the language of positive laws, as he himself
had done in Masses, they were engaging in "surreptitious, irre-
sponsible and anonymous intervention" that "upsets the whole
system." 28 Further, he sharply distinguished constitutional provi-
sions that distributed political power from those designed "to in-
sure the just exercise" of that power. The latter provisions "are not
law at all," he declared; "they are cautionary warnings. 239 Finally,
he expressed his belief that an independent judiciary could only be
235. Learned Hand, The Contribution of an Independent Judiciary to Civilization, Ad-
dress at the 250th Anniversary of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (Nov. 21,
1942) [hereinafter Independent Judiciary Address], in MASSACHusETTs B. Ass'N, THE SU-
PREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSAcHusErrs 1692-1942, at 59-67 (1942), reprinted in SPIRIT OF
LIBERTY, supra note 41, at 118.
236. Id. Five years after the Court had interred "liberty of contract," and when the
Court seemed to be moving toward a new liberal activism Hand threw in an offhand refer-
ence to a "judge who will hector the bar and browbeat the witnesses and who can find a
warrant in the Fourteenth Amendment for stifling a patently reasonable legislative experi-
ment." Id. at 121.
237. Id. at 123.
238. Id. at 120.
239. Id. at 123.
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secured at the cost of its power to annul legislation. The "price of
this [judicial] immunity, I insist," he proclaimed, "is that [the
judges] should not have the last word in those basic conflicts of
'right and wrong-between whose endless jar justice resides'. ' 240
Without judicial review, he acknowledged, he did not know what
would happen to "the fundamental principles of equity and fair
play which our constitutions enshrine. 2 41 He then offered his ulti-
mate wisdom, "but this much I think I do know-that a society so
riven that the spirit of moderation is gone, no court can save; that
a society where that spirit flourishes no court need save. '242 It was
an overblown, inappropriate, and essentially irrelevant paraphrase
of Thayer, a rhetorical flourish that masked analytical failure. It
indicated the extent to which his views had ossified and reached a
dead-end.243
The rigidification of Hand's views in the late thirties and for-
ties is suggested poignantly in the shifting tone and content of the
appreciations he wrote upon the deaths of three of the greatest ju-
dicial heroes of legal progressivism, each of whom had contributed
in one way or another to the development of judicial protection for
"fundamental" non-economic rights. In 1939 he praised Justice
Benjamin N. Cardozo, but only for the "purity" of his motives.244
Cardozo was a great judge because he had become "the detached
man" by negating his own personal interests and aspirations. In
1942 he spoke of Justice Louis D. Brandeis, but he could scarcely
bring himself even to comment on Brandeis's work as a judge. 245
He spoke primarily of other matters, referring to Brandeis's judi-
cial career only briefly and with distinct undertones of disap-
proval.246 In 1946 he spoke of Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone, and
now neither vagueness nor disapproval was sufficient.24  Unable
even to acknowledge the true nature of Stone's judicial views,
Hand distorted them shockingly and tried to claim the Chief Jus-
240. Id. at 125. This seemed a direct repudiation of his statement in "The Speech of
Justice." Cf. Speech of Justice, supra note 110, at 10-11.
241. Independent Judiciary Address, supra note 235, at 125.
242. Id. at 125.
243. Compare id. with American Doctrine, supra note 65, at 156.
244. Learned Hand, Mr. Justice Cardozo, 52 HARv. L. REV. 361 (1939), reprinted in
SPIRIT OF LIBERTY, supra note 41, at 98, 98-101.
245. Learned Hand, Mr. Justice Brandeis, Address at Supreme Court Memorial Service
(Dec. 21, 1942), in SPIRIT OF LIBERTY, supra note 41, at 127, 127-33.
246. Id. "Allied with [his opposition to large size] was his attitude towards concentra-
tion of political power which appeared so often in what he said from the bench. Indeed, his
determination to preserve the autonomy of the states ... amounted almost to an obses-
sion." Id. at 130 (emphasis added).
247. Chief Justice Stone, supra note 62, at 152-57.
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tice for his own brand of extreme judicial deference." 8
However complex Hand's thought, however open-minded and
skeptical, the issue of judicial review now seemed to him one of
black and white. "And make no mistake," he declared in his
twisted tribute to Stone, the "tradition of detachment and aloof-
ness without which, I am persuaded, courts and judges will fail"
was "under attack. ' 240 Committed to decisive new battle lines, he
armed himself-ironically-with absolute conviction in order to
battle the most frightening enemy, the forces of good suddenly
turned evil.2 50
IV. VALEDICTORY
In 1951 Hand agreed to deliver the Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
Lectures at Harvard Law School, the most prestigious lecture fo-
rum in American legal education. For years thereafter, he worried
about the heavily hanging obligation, writing and rewriting his
drafts. He recognized, Gunther explains, "that [the lectures] would
be his farewell statements, and he dreaded the overwhelming re-
sponsibility they represented. '25 1
At long last, on three successive nights in February, 1958 he
delivered the lectures. Each evening a full audience packed the
hall, and an overflow spilled into two large classrooms where loud-
speakers carried his voice. The scene, declared one witness, was
like "the entrance to a big theatre where a hit was playing. 25 2
Though Hand had requested a special chair for his bad back, he
delivered his lectures standing. "His eyes, often melancholy and
moody in repose," Gunther writes, "gazed piercingly at the audi-
ence, and they glistened with emotion-partly from sentiment,
partly from the intensity of his urge to convey a deeply felt mes-
sage. ' 253 Within months, Harvard University Press published the
lectures under the somewhat inflated title The Bill of Rights.25 4
Distilling his deepest concerns and reflections, Hand offered
the legal world his conclusions, polished with elegance and honed
to an edge. Judicial review, he declared, was socially dangerous,
legally unprincipled, and constitutionally illegitimate. Rejecting
the validity of a "double standard" that would justify greater pro-
248. Id. at 155-56; see also GUNTHER supra note 1, at 565 n.* (commenting on Hand's
remarks about Justice Stone).
249. Chief Justice Stone, supra note 62, at 157.
250. Id. at 155-56.
251. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 671.
252. Id. at 653.
253. Id.
254. HAND, supra note 4.
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tection for "personal" as opposed to "property" rights, Hand
sharply criticized the Warren Court and, in particular, questioned
the consitutional legitimacy of Brown v. Board of Education,255
then but four years old and the target of intensive political
opposition.
The Bill of Rights was not significant for its originality or bril-
liance. It was classic Hand and contained little that he had not
been saying for at least fifteen years. Its importance, instead, arose
from its context. First, the occasion made it loom important. It was
the valedictory of a judicial legend delivered as the Holmes Lec-
tures at the Harvard Law School. Second, its critique of the War-
ren Court gave it immediate salience, and its challenge to Brown's
legitimacy conferred special gravity that went well beyond the
depth of its brief comments on the case. Finally, a massive change
in the attitudes of the American left guaranteed the book the sta-
tus of constitutional bete noire. The old "progressive dogma" had
largely disappeared, and in its place reigned ideas of incorporation,
preferred freedoms, and the virtues of a new liberal judicial
activism.
Gunther approaches The Bill of Rights gingerly, distancing
himself from its more extreme claims while insisting that Hand's
position not be oversimplified. Summarizing each lecture suc-
cinctly, he identifies its major contentions and notes the qualifica-
tions the judge placed on them.256 In discussing the first lecture,
for example, where Hand maintained that judicial review was not
authorized by the Constitution, Gunther notes that the judge also
argued that the practice was "not lawless" and that, as a practical
matter, it was essential to the union.25' Similarly, in summarizing
the third lecture, where Hand maintained that as a matter of "con-
stitutional interpretation" the First Amendment was not entitled
to any "measure of protection different from other interests,"'25
Gunther calls attention to Hand's acceptance, again as a practical
matter, of the need for some judicial protection of First Amend-
ment values.259
Gunther's discussion of the first and third lectures suggests
the extent to which Hand was determined to present an uncompro-
mising position. He treated "constitutional interpretation" almost
arbitrarily as a narrow matter of language analysis, and he surely
inflated the weight of the separation of powers argument against
255. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
256. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 655-59.
257. Id. at 655; cf. HAND, supra note 4, at 10-11, 14-15.
258. HAND, supra note 4, at 56.
259. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 658; HAND, supra note 4, at 69.
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260judicial review. Moreover, Hand himself offered not only practi-
cal reasons, but legal reasons as well, for a limited type of judicial
review. 261 Without altering the substance of his remarks, he could
have presented a more modulated set of lectures than he did. His
flinty tone and extreme assertions were purposely chosen, not the
inevitable result of an unflinching logical analysis. Presumably
crafted to manifest the presence of a pure judicial soul, the lec-
tures overshot the mark and were far less persuasive than they
might have been.26 2
It was the second lecture, however, that contained the "most
provocative aspect of Hand's message. ' '263 First, he declared that
the Due Process Clause and other similar constitutional phrases
were too vague to be enforceable by the courts. Attempts to give
them practical meaning led only to judicial subjectivity and the
transformation of the judiciary into "a third legislative cham-
ber. '26 4 Then, he launched into a sharp critique of the Warren
Court, charging that it was reviving a discredited substantive due
process and falling into an erratic subjectivism.265 Finally, he con-
cluded by challenging Brown's constitutional validity. The decision
did not invalidate segregation in public schools on the basis of a
race-neutral constitutional principle, he explained, but rather it
voided "the 'legislative judgment' of states by its own reappraisal
of the relative values at stake.
266
Social conservatives and southern segregationists praised
Hand's message, and Gunther notes their efforts to exploit it. 260 At
the very time Hand was delivering his lectures, in fact, conserva-
tive Republicans and southern Democrats were pushing a retalia-
tory bill in Congress that would have eliminated the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction over several classes of cases involving
anti-subversion issues. Although the bill did not deal with school
desegregation, it was animated by a deep hostility to the Warren
Court that was driven by hatred of Brown. Quickly, the bill's sup-
porters seized on Hand's lectures to support their charge that the
Court was legislating. Gunther describes Hand's effort to distin-
guish his views from those of the Court's congressional foes and to
make clear his substantive opposition to their bill. Recalling his
260. HAND, supra note 4, at 10-11.
261. Id. at 11, 15, 29-30, 31-33.
262. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 662-64. Gunther describes the academic response to
Hand's lectures as "almost universally negative." Id. at 662.
263. Id. at 655.
264. HAND, supra note 4, at 42.
265. See id. at 45-46, 50-55.
266. Id. at 54.
267. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 659-62.
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rejection of Theodore Roosevelt's plan for the "recall" of judicial
decisions and Franklin Roosevelt's "Court packing" proposal, Gun-
ther concludes that Hand's response to the anti-Court bill was
based on long-standing and principled views. He always "drew the
line at tampering with the Court's powers."2 "
Gunther's explanation for Hand's attack on Brown is enlight-
ening and important. It contains four factors of noticeably differ-
ent weight. First, of course, was Hand's long-standing view of the
political dangers of the Due Process Clause." 9 Second was the fact
that Hand was almost awed by the nature of his platform and the
extravagant expectations that his audience held. He was, Gunther
declares, "obsessed by his drive to produce logically airtight argu-
ments. '270 Next was the fact that Hand no longer "read most Su-
preme Court decisions with care." He was largely out-of-touch with
the Court's opinions, its docket, and its inner workings. 1 Finally,
there was Frankfurter. Hand's "doubts about judicial activism had
increased during his last years,21 72 Gunther declares, and his views
in The Bill of Rights were "more extreme" than those he had ex-
pressed earlier.273 "The best explanation of Hand's extreme, stark
position," he continues, "can be found in his private correspon-
dence" with Frankfurter "where the Warren Court's performance
evoked comments as bitter and sarcastic as those he had directed
at the product of the Nine Old Men in the 1930s. ' '274 Frankfurter
was Hand's "only direct pipeline to the Court and his most impor-
tant source of information about Court decisions. 275 For his part,
Frankfurter "had grown increasingly bitter about most of his col-
leagues" and consistently "poured out scathing denunciations in
letter after letter. 2 76 Highlighting both Frankfurter's "personal pi-
que" and his habit of implying that his colleagues were operating
from base motives, Gunther concludes that "Hand accepted Frank-
furter's often excessive invective uncritically. 27 7
Most pointedly, Gunther argues that Hand's interpretation of
268. Id. at 661. See also HAND, supra note 4, at 226-27, for Hand's formal response to a
Senate inquiry.
269. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 664 (arguing that Hand's views represented "no sudden
emergence of conservatism").
270. Id. at 671.
271. See id. at 665, 667 n.*.
272. Id. at 664.







Brown "came directly from Felix Frankfurter. 2 s78 In the key pas-
sage in The Bill of Rights, Hand considered two possible interpre-
tations of Brown. "[D]id the Court mean to 'overrule' the 'legisla-
tive judgment' of states by its own reappraisal of the relative
values at stake?"279 Hand asked. "Or did it hold that it was alone
enough to invalidate ,the statutes that they had denied racial
equality because the [Fourteenth] [A]mendment inexorably ex-
empts that interest from legislative appraisal. ' 280 Stressing the fact
that Brown did not overrule Plessy v. Ferguson"' but rather "dis-
tinguished [it] because of the increased importance of education,"
Hand decided that Brown could not be reconciled with the princi-
ple that the Constitution prohibits racial classifications.282 He con-
cluded, therefore, that Brown represented the old judicial policy
making, not the triumph of a race-neutral constitutional principle.
Gunther's important contribution is to show that Hand had ini-
tially considered Brown as standing for a constitutional principle
of race neutrality and that he had continued to hold that view for
several years until shortly before he delivered his lectures. Frank-
furter, however, "repeatedly told Hand between 1956 and 1958, in
letter after letter, what meaning the Supreme Court intended to
convey in Brown. '283 That meaning, the Justice insisted, was not
to bar all uses of racial classification, but rather to exclude them
only in the area of public education. That was the pivotal interpre-
tation that Hand finally adopted. It was, Gunther writes, "Hand's
delayed surrender to Frankfurter's self-serving interpretation of
Brown."2 84
Frankfurter's purpose in conducting his dogged campaign to
change Hand's view, Gunther explains, was to prevent the latter's
long-anticipated lectures from interfering with his own campaign
to prevent the Court from considering and invalidating southern
miscegenation laws.2 88 Such a ruling, Frankfurter feared, would fire
southern hostility to the Court and further jeopardize efforts to de-
segregate the public schools. Hand, however, believed that Brown
required invalidation of miscegenation laws. "There was no legiti-
mate escape from ruling on miscegenation, he bluntly told Frank-
278. Id. at 666; id. at 665-72.
279. HAND, supra note 4, at 54.
280. Id.
281. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
282. HAND, supra note 4, at 54; id. at 54-55.
283. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 666.
284. Id. at 671.
285. Id. at 666-67. Gunther points out that twice, in 1955 and 1956, Frankfurter had
persuaded the Court to dismiss cases that presented the constitutionality of miscegenation
laws. Id. at 667.
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furter," Gunther reports, "and no possible constitutional distinc-
tion between that issue and school segregation." ' Although
Frankfurter persisted, "as late as September 1957, Hand refused to
go along" with his interpretation.28 7 Increasingly desperate, Frank-
furter "bombarded" Hand with theories for distinguishing misce-
genation from school desegregation, and then in the fall of 1957 he
hit upon the "decisive response." Frankfurter "asserted ... inside
knowledge of the Court's deliberations on Brown to persuade Hand
that the Court had not intended an across-the-board rule barring
discriminatory racial factors in state laws." '288 It was this claim of
"inside knowledge," Gunther argues, together with the fact that
Hand "was suffering from fatigue about the lectures" that led him
at the last minute to "reluctantly accept[ ] Frankfurter's gloss" on
Brown.289
Gunther's argument raises an obvious question: How could
Hand have ignored the series of per curiam decisions that the
Court handed down between 1954 and 1957 extending Brown to
public parks, beaches, buses, airports, and golf courses?"" Ac-
knowledging their obvious significance, Gunther explains that by
the mid-fifties, "Hand was not a sufficiently careful follower of Su-
preme Court rulings to know" about the decisions. 29 1 "Frankfurter
never told Hand" about them,29 2 and, more surprising, neither did
any of those who offered Hand advice about his lectures and told
him "that he had to discuss Brown."293 If Gunther is correct about
the path Hand took in reaching his conclusion about Brown, it sug-
gests not only that Hand had indeed become "fatigued" with his
lectures but also that he was surely no longer functioning at his
best.
While Gunther's argument about Frankfurter's influence is
persuasive, his claim that Hand was unaware of the per curiam
decisions extending Brown seems dubious. Even assuming that
Frankfurter never told Hand about them, and even assuming that
Hand no longer read the U.S. Reports, is it possible that he had
not read about the decisions in the newspapers or heard them dis-
cussed by friends and acquaintances? The decisions were a topic of
intense public and professional debate at the time. Indeed, is it
286. Id.
287. Id. at 669.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 669, 671.






possible that Hand's various law clerks who worked with him on
the lectures would not have felt impelled by duty to call the cases
to the judge's attention? Rather than ignorance causing an over-
sight, it seems more likely that Hand knew of the cases and simply
chose to ignore them, perhaps because they were per curiam opin-
ions and did not articulate any constitutional principle.
Gunther's discussion also raises a broader and more perplexing
question: How and why did such a judge and philoso-
pher-seasoned, skeptical, and sophisticated-decide that the
overriding goal of his valedictory should be "to produce logically
airtight arguments? '2 4 That was, after all, as Gunther rightly
judges, the fatal flaw in The Bill of Rights. 2 5 Sixty years earlier, as
a young man writing his first law review article, Hand had recog-
nized that any legal rule was ultimately based on "a reason of pol-
icy, not of logic. ' 29  His first wisdom-indeed, quite ironically,
Thayer's ultimate constitutional wisdom-was the recognition that
in understanding the scope of judicial review "logically airtight ar-
guments" were, ultimately, either irrelevant or arbitrary. Hand's
quest for such arguments, however, revealed the ossification of his
thought.297 Gunther's conclusion is on the mark. "Ultimately, the
bleakness, pessimism, and extremism of Hand's final major state-
ment," he explains, "did not do full justice to the richness, sub-
tlety, and complexity of his lifelong search for a delicate balance"
in dealing with judicial review. 298
CONCLUSION
Gunther has written a monumental biography that allows us
for the first time to begin to understand Learned Hand and to
place him accurately in his historical context. It is a superb
accomplishment.
Considering the book as a whole, and Hand's place in twenti-
eth-century American legal and intellectual history, several tenta-
tive conclusions seem warranted. First, Hand's life suggests that a
commitment to judicial restraint, like a commitment to any other
294. Id. at 671.
295. See id. at 672.
296. Learned Hand, Restitution or Unjust Enrichment, 11 HARV. L. REV. 249, 249-50
(1897).
297. This hypothesis may explain some of Hand's overblown and even purposely obtuse
statements. See, e.g., HAND, supra note 4, at 39, 55, 73-74. It is worth noting, too, that at the
time Hand was writing his lectures, he was still expressing privately his profound doubts as
to whether "the LAW, as I used to think of it, has any genuine 'principles'." GUNTHER,
supra note 1, at 677.
298. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 672.
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judicial posture, may be the product of the individual's deepest
emotional and psychological drives. In deciding to stay his or her
hand, in other words, the restrained judge may be serving personal
needs as much as the activist judge who "imposes" his or her own
values on others. Hand's life, indeed, suggests that judicial re-
straint no more proves the absence of driving personal motivations
than judicial activism proves their presence.
Second, the label "Thayerian" does not do justice to Hand's
thinking or to its evolution. Although he was deeply influenced by
Thayer, he nevertheless adapted his teacher's ideas to his own pur-
poses. Before World War I he ignored the significance of Thayer's
alternative standard of review for state actions, infused progressive
ideals into the argument for judicial restraint, and then in Masses
found a way to elude the substance of Thayer's injunction by mag-
nifying his loyalty to its form. After his transformation during the
1920s and 1930s, he moved in a different direction, basing Thayer's
doctrine on a more narrow and pessimistic view of democracy, sep-
arating it wholly from the substantive social values it served, and
turning it into a more rigid rule than his teacher had proposed or
thought desirable.
Third, Hand's continued deference to democratic decision-
making is something less than it initially appears. True, he held
firm to his idea of democratic practice and insisted that it de-
manded judicial restraint. But his post-World War I idea of de-
mocracy marked a break with his earlier views and was in signifi-
cant part the product of the anti-democratic vogue of the 1920s
and early 1930s. For Hand democracy became a poor and minimal-
ist political norm, based on a passive acceptance of the "bloodless"
rule of the more powerful and largely devoid of significant commu-
nal ideals and moral aspirations. 29 9 His inability to see any galva-
nizing connection between democracy as a social and moral ideal
and the Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education must
render his fidelity to the idea of democracy a dubious virtue.
Finally, Gunther's biography suggests that Hand's valedictory
represented neither the ultimate wisdom of a great judge nor a
299. During World War II Hand occasionally spoke in more elevated terms. See, e.g.,
Learned Hand, Address at the Fiftieth Anniversary Commencement Reunion and Ceremony
(May 26, 1943), in SPmrr OF LBERTY, supra note 41, at 133, 133-36; Learned Hand, Philhel-
lene Editorial, in Spnrr OF LBERTY, supra note 41, at 139, 139-41; Learned Hand, The
Spirit of Liberty, Address at "I Am an American Day" Ceremony in Central Park, New
York (May 21, 1944), in SPiRrr OF LIBERTY, supra note 41, at 143, 143-45. For the most part,
however, his social hopes and aspirations remained minimal. See, e.g., HAND, supra note 4,
at 73-74. Hand's deepest commitments were to individual freedom, especially intellectual
freedom, not to broad social or democratic goals. See, e.g., Liberty, supra note 220, at 109-
18. Contra Ronald Dworkin, Mr. Liberty, 41 N.Y. REv. BOOKS 17, 21-22 (1994).
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timeless articulation of essential truths about judicial review.
Rather, it was a marker at one point in Hand's evolution, the prod-
uct of complex personal and historical forces that reveal the con-
tingent nature of its formulation. It was the product of a great
judge at far less than his best, and it was also the product of inade-
quate research, misleading information, and a misguided quest for
"logically airtight arguments" in a field where wisdom and justice
lay elsewhere.
